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

COMMUNIST CHINA

A Special Report

25c

MAY 13, 1957

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Is a population such as that claimed by the Chinese Communists an explosive force or a protean mass whose planned expansions and undirected movements alike threaten its neighbors? Or does this immense population . . . doom the Chinese themselves to a life where hunger, ignorance, and their associated instabilities preclude either substantial economic advance or enduring political power?

—Dr. Irene B. Taeuber,
Office of Population Research,
Princeton University



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The New Republic

A JOURNAL OF OPINION

MAY 13, 1957

COMMUNIST CHINA
A SPECIAL REPORT

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"Recognizing" China

FIVE TIMES since 1951, the Congress has recorded its unanimous opinion that Communist China is not worthy of membership in the United Nations—and by implication, that it does not deserve to be recognized by our government. The Congressional gestures were noble in intent, but they might mislead us. We might infer from these resolutions that Communist China is a supplicant, begging us to affirm its legitimacy. That inference is not sustained by the evidence.

True, US Ambassador Alexis Johnson has never raised, in any of his more than one hundred talks with Communist Chinese spokesmen in Geneva, the issue of US recognition, or the precise terms under which we might be willing to accord such recognition. But neither have the Chinese! Diplomatic talks have been confined to narrower questions: the imprisonment of eight Americans by Peking; whether Peking need only forswear the use of force in settling international disputes, or whether such a vow must refer explicitly to Formosa and the islands lying offshore China. The Communist Chinese and we seem agreed on one thing: there's no hurry. If there was once a time when the Communists were anxious for recognition and therefore willing to pay a high price for it, that time has long since gone. What remains is the frustrated desire of each side to "punish" the other—and the impotence of each to do much about it.

Meanwhile, the Peking regime goes about its business; it pursues an active diplomacy throughout not only the Communist world but the non-Communist as well. It has reasonably normal relations not only with the larger nations of Asia—India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia—but with our allies in Europe—Great Britain, Norway, the Netherlands. Its foreign minister travels to Eastern Europe where he confers on doctrinal and diplomatic matters. In return, the Premier of Poland makes his pilgrimage to Peking. Commerce expands between China and other nations, and the US is at least indirectly involved in these transactions when our friends, in their own interest, put pressure on us to relax the embargo against Peking.

All this means that the question is not whether we shall have relations with Communist China, but what those relations shall be. As Edwin Borchard and William Lage observed in their book on *Neutrality for the United States:*

> Both law and life frown upon long-continued uncertainty. A country refusing to recognize a fact must either content itself with making faces or must fight. Little satisfaction can be derived from either alternative.

Even less satisfaction can be derived today from the second alternative, for the Borchard-Lage book was written almost a decade before fighting between great powers could touch off atomic annihilation.

Much has been said about the eight Americans still in Chinese jails.

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That is deplorable, but not central. Surely the character of our relations with Communist China does not turn on that single fact. Assuming the will, on both sides, for more normal relations, it is hard to believe that Chinese insistence on retaining these men (and for what purpose?) would be the rock on which agreement would founder.

Much is also made of the fact that the Communist Chinese were aggressors in Korea. They would of course deny it, insisting that they entered the fighting only after UN troops had crossed the 38th Parallel. But let us affirm their guilt. They are then more culpable than were the Russians in Hungary, since in Hungary there were no UN forces to be fought. And they are more culpable than the British, the French or the Israelis, who withdrew their troops on order of the UN.

We may agree that Communist China stands morally condemned for its intervention in Korea. And where does that lead us? Exactly nowhere. The Mao regime bypasses our indignation and deals bilaterally with nations with which it wishes to deal, and on terms pretty much of its own choosing. It is committed to nothing as far as the US is concerned, for it is neither recognized by nor recognizes us. Likewise, it is bound by no obligations specifically assumed by members of the United Nations.

It is simply *there*. And not one of the well-informed contributors to this Special Report doubts that the Peking regime is (as a former State Department Consul in Hong Kong puts it) "stable and firmly established." *Look* magazine's Edmund Stevens, one of the few Americans to report extensively throughout the Communist world, concluded after his visit to China last December (against the wishes of the State Department) that Peking "has a far broader base of popular support than any other Communist government, including that of the Soviet Union."

His conclusion is not complimentary to the USSR, but it is positively horrifying to important persons in our government. It is so shocking, it must not be true. What the mind cannot accept, it does not accept. Thus, when Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson tours the Far East six months ago, Keyes Beech of the *Chicago Daily News* finds him "clinging to the hope that the Chinese people will rise up to throw off their Communist yoke"—a hope, adds Beech, "which is not supported in any way by first-hand reports from China." And on his Asian trip this year, Sen. Albert Gore discovers that ranking US military officers on Formosa confidently predict that the Nationalists will regain control of the mainland.

The objective of US policy should be to contain Communist power in Asia, but that objective is brought no closer by self-hypnosis.

THERE was a period when it could be claimed that our fiction of Chiang's representing China helped hold in line the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, discouraging their defection to Peking. But since 1955, when Chinese businessmen inside China finally gave up their properties to the regime and became state-employed technocrats, the Chinese businessman in Singapore or Bangkok—who is less of a romantic than Secretary Robertson—has held no illusions about where China is located. Nor has he failed to note the mainland's industrial progress.

What becomes of our unstated premise that non-recognition and blockade would bring about suffering, even collapse, inside China? The past eight years should discourage us from holding to that premise. The West's trade ban is breaking apart: Japan's exports to China of cement and textiles alone have increased by 116 percent. If the Mao regime is succeeded by another, it is almost certain that the new regime will come out of what now exists on the mainland—and not arise because of pressure from Formosa or pronouncements from Secretary Dulles.

★

THE Secretary of State has often remarked that our present policy toward China, or rather non-policy, is required by the "national interest." That raises the interesting historical question of whether and how much our "national interest" was advanced by refusing for 14 years to recognize the Soviet Union. Our abstention neither undermined nor mellowed Communist leadership—though it may have been useful in convincing the Russian people that only through unquestioning obedience to the regime could Russia survive the hostility of the capitalist West. Our arms-length dealings with the USSR during this period may also have contributed to the innocent and painfully wrong view of the Soviet system which was held for so long by so many American intellectuals.

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From time to time, individuals have privately advanced various schemes for overcoming the deadlock in our relations with Communist China. All such proposals have bounced off an impenetrable wall of official resistance. What is preventing serious public debate of our China policy? We can only surmise that the reason is fear of political reprisal. A forceful minority, passionately led by Senator Knowland, has made it appear that even suggesting a re-examination of policy is tantamount to treason. Democrats are as cowed as Republicans. On China, we have truly bi-partisan agreement. And so, when Presidential consultant Meyer Kestnbaum says aloud that "ultimately" we will have to recognize Communist China, he is immediately shoved against the wall and asked to recant or get out.

Newspaper editors and publishers have tried, unsuccessfully so far, to separate the general issue of our relations with China from the smaller issue of free entry of American newsmen into China. But Secretary Dulles will not grant that any such separation is justified. For if newsmen go, will not missionaries go, and if missionaries go, will not businessmen go, and if businessmen go, won't our China policy go? Moreover, says the Secretary, freedom of the press is freedom to publish, not to gather the news abroad. Indeed, he says frankly in his letter last week to *New York Times* publisher Arthur Sulzberger that

> Foreign policy and diplomacy cannot succeed unless it channels the activities of our people, and in this respect newspapers have also their loyalty and patriotic duty.

The implications of this statement are fascinating and take us far beyond the controversy over travel by newsmen to the Chinese mainland. It becomes our patriotic duty *not* to know what is happening. If we do not know, how then can we criticize those—such as Mr. Dulles—who *do* know?

★

ON December 7, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek made his historic crossing to Formosa. It was the Rubicon, and it signalled triumph for the new Communist regime in Peking. We know what is past, but what lies ahead? On what possible terms can we live with this new regime? How much do we even know about it? Since early 1950, when the last US officials left the mainland, we have in the most literal sense lost contact with one-fourth of the human race. Although the State Department estimates that 50 Americans are now in China—eight civilian prisoners, 13 Korean War "turncoats," ex-missionaries, wives of Chinese, partisans of the regime—for seven years *no qualified American reporter entered China.* Only in December did two American journalists defy the State Department ban and briefly visit the mainland.

The Communists themselves were responsible for this news blackout until last summer, when for the first time Peking opened its gates to leading US correspondents stationed in the Far East. The gates on this side were then shut by our government.

Where do we turn for the knowledge that permits intelligent judgment? From the 10 articles in this issue, it is clear that China is the most dynamic power in Asia —and perhaps in the Communist world. Why this is so is the question analysed by Richard Hughes and Dr. Robert J. Lifton. Other contributors remind us that the regime confronts profound problems: How, for example, can China grow enough food to keep pace with a growing population and still invest heavily in industry for military power? Mao's answer—the "audacious" gamble of collectivizing the peasantry—appears to be based on confidence in the regime's unshakable character. Alexander Eckstein in his article suggests that, for all we hear of "unrest" in China, Peking may be able to "have its cake and eat it too"—industrializing rapidly while still increasing agricultural production.

The central objective of US policy, we repeat, should be the containment of Communist power in Asia. But tactically, that objective is related to the question of the solidarity of the Communist world. How dependent is Peking on Moscow? How similar, how different are their approaches to "national Communism"? To what extent does our present policy reinforce rather than weaken the Soviet-Chinese alliance? How well is our national interest served by a policy of non-recognition that isolates us from leading non-Communist countries in Asia? Has popular ignorance in this country of the potential power of Chinese Communism inhibited us from assisting as fully as we should China's non-Communist neighbors?

Clues to some of the answers are given in the following pages. This is no more than an "interim report." We shall know more when we see more, and we shall see more when the Secretary of State accepts the fact that nothing so endangers US foreign policy as an uninformed and therefore irresponsible public opinion.

IN COMING ISSUES

MELVYN DOUGLAS on *Clarence Darrow*
and a previously unpublished poem on Darrow by Edgar Lee Masters

MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE (editor, *Punch*) on *Low, The Cartoonist*

RICHARD ROVERE on *Arthur Miller*

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MAJOR QUESTION MARKS

How Has China Changed?

In Facing Up to Peking's "Stable and Firmly Established Regime... Emotion Is No Substitute for Intelligence, Nor Rigidity for Prudence"

by HOWARD L. BOORMAN

A EUROPEAN newsman, well traveled in the East, observed after a visit to India in 1948 that he felt the situation in that country to be serious but not desperate. In China, during the same period, one frequently had the feeling that the Chinese situation was desperate but—in a perverse way—not serious. Like sturdy *kaoliang* stalks, the Chinese people would bend briefly in the wind of new vicissitudes, but the good earth of China would somehow, in the end, steady their roots as it had so many times before.

In Asia, as in other parts of the world, the present age has bred perplexed personalities and political anomalies, individual insecurity and national neurosis. Throughout the East, thoughtful men and women, young and old, have been torn between the sharp challenges of the modern world and the lingering appeals of their own pasts. Increasingly alienated from the conservative, stabilizing forces of tradition, the individual has fallen easy prey to the great contemporary plague: restlessness. In China, however, the supple spirit of the people—active, usually cheerful, sometimes feckless—tended to obscure the glacier-like process of erosion and social change. Possibly the kaleidoscopic quality of Chinese adjustment to uncertainty bemused observers and aided in initial underestimation of the true seriousness of the impact of Communism on China.

Impossible though the Communist victory appeared to contemporary bystanders outside the Far East, in the years 1948 and 1949 it did become a fact in China. One by one, the great cities fell to the Communist troops, lean and battle-toughened, fresh from the countryside. Within 12 months, the Southern Expedition of the Red Armies moved from Mukden, industrial heart of Manchuria, to Canton, bustling capital of Kwangtung province in the south—1,500 miles.

The tumultuous years since 1948-49 have seen the emergence of a new Communist nation, disciplined and dynamic, on the mainland of Eastern Asia. What has happened in China? How can we measure the depth and the dimensions of the Chinese Communist revolution? What has been the impact of Communism on the most populous country of the Far East? These questions, more easily posed than answered, are fundamental to perceptive understanding of the contemporary Asian scene.

The inquiry may well begin with a conclusion. The Chinese Communists now have a stable and firmly established regime. Through skillful coordination of political and military tactics, they have set up a unified national government with the capacity to rule to the farthest

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HOWARD L. BOORMAN *served in the US Consulate at Peking from 1947 until the last Americans left China in 1950 and then, as a Consul in Hong Kong, set up and directed the State Department's listening post on Communist China. For his work in establishing this monitoring service—prime Western source for translations of the mainland press—Boorman received a Rockefeller Public Service Award in 1954-55. He is now director of the Research Project on Men and Politics in Modern China at Columbia University and co-author of the just-published* Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains.

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reaches of the land as no central regime in China has been able to rule for well over a century. Indeed the emergence of this strong Communist China in the Far East is one of the most portentous developments of our age. While reactions, both in Asia and in the non-Asian world, differ widely in assessment of the immediate and long-term significance of this fact, there can be little doubt in 1957 about the reality of Chinese Communism and Communist China.

It would be idle to assume that we now possess final answers to the many questions posed by the Chinese Communist challenge. But we do know Peking's general intentions and the determinants of Peking's ability to achieve its goals.

In the domestic sphere, the Chinese Communists are committed to the attainment of four major national goals:

Peking aims at the implementation of a broad ideological revolution in the values and attitudes of the Chinese people and a thoroughgoing rice-roots transformation of the structure of Chinese society.

Peking aims at the creation of a unified and closely-knit apparatus of totalitarian control over mainland China.

Peking aims at employment of advanced technological methods to develop Communist China into a modern industrial nation.

Peking aims at the organization of the strongest indigenous military force in Asia.

Mao Tse-tung and his associates do not hold these lusty ambitions as ends in themselves. These plans are inextricably related to broader, international objectives: the maintenance of Communist China as the dominant power of Asia and the maintenance of the Sino-Soviet alliance as the prime instrument for spreading Communist influence in the world at large. The present discussion, however, is focused only upon the contours of the situation within China itself.

INITIALLY, one must assess the Chinese Communist ideological onslaught: the attempt to impose a radically new pattern of belief upon the minds of that quarter of the world's population within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China. Harnessing the deep-seated, latent Chinese distrust of the West to the vehicle of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Peking has mobilized a great national drive around one primary theme: China resurgent as a Communist nation. Already the Communists have manipulated the intellectual and emotional components of their ideological program so that, through the many strands in the national organizational fabric, the drive touches every individual on the mainland of China. To what extent is Peking actually successful in reorienting the assumptions and values of the Chinese people? Can Peking force the Chinese, traditionally a backward-looking people, to face forward to the new Communist future with confidence and assurance? Will Peking's preoccupation with indoctrination of the young of China lead, in the end, to stimulation or to sterility? Is it possible to distinguish the elements of rational thought and irrational compulsion intertwined in the minds of the party leaders? In the long run, will the nation-wide program of "thought reform" be more successful than Communist efforts have been in Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union? And what of intellectual incentives? If Peking, in its zealous pursuit of technological advance, permits access to non-Communist ideas and publications from the West, can the Communist rulers of China be certain that the intellectual ferment which might result from this exposure will remain confined within approved channels?

STRESSES AND STRAINS

CAN the leaders in Peking maintain the discipline and integrity of the party, swollen during the past decade to the point where, with some 12 million members, it is the largest Communist Party in the world? And can the party leaders preserve the unusual degree of cohesion which (except for Kao Kang's ill-fated bid for power and his resulting purge) has made the history of the Communist Party in China stand in sharp contrast to that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Communist Parties in the world? Will Mao Tse-tung, who has held firm control of top command within the party for more than two decades, retain his grip in the face of new problems and fresh energies? Which of the other senior leaders—Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing—is most likely to succeed Mao? Is the party's apparatus of control, persuasion, and terror (both actual and implied) adequate to deal with threats of resistance and friction within China? Is it possible to maintain the present enormous bureaucracies of the party and the government as efficient and responsive political structures, or will indecision and corruption at various levels in the hierarchy sap their vigor?

Some observers see the greatest potential strains in the economic sphere, where Peking's goal is the creation of a socialized China with a substantial heavy industry base. Certainly the present level of economic activity in China represents a radical change from the chaos and paralysis of 1948-49, and the leaders in Peking are determined to allocate the maximum possible portion of national output to national economic development. But, while Peking has solved some difficult problems, it has created many more. In the matter of total investment requirements, a considerable gap still exists between the actual and the desired. The agricultural sector of the Chinese economy remains basic, and the attitude of the Chinese peasant is thus a critical—and potentially erosive—element in the nation's economic calculations. Will the present accelerated tempo of agricultural collectivization breed wide-

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"Killing Two Birds With One Arrow": As shaft labelled "Eisenhower Doctrine" strikes buzzards—England and France—greedy US runs to catch colonial possessions. (*People's Daily,* April 14.)

spread rural resistance? What incentives can Peking realistically provide to expand agricultural output? What of water and of weather? Neither flood nor drought is subject to the total control of the planners in Peking. And what of another basic production problem—Chinese babies—closely related to the long-term issue of agricultural production? The pressure of population growth, even though it may to some extent be minimized through birth-control measures, inevitably creates a serious barrier to steady economic growth. Will enforced migration of Chinese workers and settlers to the thinly-populated regions of the interior ease economic pressures in China proper, or will resettlement under duress bring more problems than it solves?

Peking's concentration upon development of heavy industry points toward another basic national goal: maintenance of a strong military force. Only through building an adequate industrial and technological base, Peking maintains, can Communist China support its long-range political objectives and equip its military units with the latest weapons. During the past decade, the Chinese Communists have gone far in converting the heterogeneous Red forces of civil war days into the unified and diversified organization which is now a modern regular army. Yet the military focus of the present rulers in Peking also creates new dilemmas. Can the Chinese economy sustain this heavy military burden? Granted that the true strength of the Communist movement within China has always depended, essentially, upon its armies, China's neighbors may well query Peking's present and future plans for its armed forces. And, from the military standpoint, Peking faces the fact that increased modernization of its military establishment leads to increased vulnerability to an opponent with long-range air power and nuclear weapons. Will developing industrialization, improved communications, and growing mechanization conspire to destroy that very fluidity which was the original base of Chinese Communist military strength?

And what of the millions upon millions of individual Chinese who combine to produce that abstraction which we label "Communist China"? Are they any less blind to the hazards of conformity than individuals elsewhere in the world? Do they deem its price small for the satisfaction which comes from sharing in activity which seems to promise individual fulfillment, which appears to provide new dimensions to existence hitherto marginal and meaningless? In the absence of bandits, warlords, and conquerors, are they likely to see menace in controlled currency and rationed food supplies? Does the new litany of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism provide easy escape from the conflict between decaying traditional standards and inadequately understood foreign ideals and material values? How is the individual affected by the emergence of a Communist-led "New China" with a new sense of national nerve and a renewed vision of national destiny?

Even if it were possible to come to general agreement on answers to the complex questions suggested above, the world would face other issues no less knotty. The China problem may be studied through the statistical data and bleak news reports issued from Peking by the official New China News Agency—a limited approach which neglects as much as it may illuminate. What of the larger dimensions? Can we stretch our vision to encompass the broader and more pervasive issues inherent in the general development which is Chinese Communism at mid-20th Century?

VIEWED from the Chinese standpoint, it is clear that China, for a hundred years or more, has been torn with the greatest upheaval in its long history: a search for national integration and for a sure sense of identity as a modern nation. And, viewed from the Western standpoint, it is clear that China has had to work out its salvation during a period when the environment of international politics has been in grave disorder. The result has been unfortunate: modern China and the modern non-Chinese world have never truly met on a mature basis of mutual respect and confidence. Wishful thinking, unrealistic assessments, illusions of understanding—all combined to produce conflict and frustration. Nor does the present situation promise an easy solution,

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for the older condition of *malaise* in modern China has now come, stumblingly, to its rendezvous with Marxism and with Mao Tse-tung.

Thus the murky concepts—Tradition and Change—inspire more hesitation in their Chinese context than in any other. It is easy to be impressed with activity and innovation on the surface in Communist China. How much more skilled must be the assayer who attempts to estimate the proportion of residual ingredients from the past in the present mixture. It is simple to label the Chinese Communist an iconoclast. How much more perceptive must be the analyst who attempts to determine whether the political commissar is indeed a successful rebel against the old China or whether he may, to some extent, be the unwitting captive of the very heritage of ideas and behavior against which his rebellion is directed.

STILL "THE MIDDLE KINGDOM"

CHINA, historically, has been an extraordinarily complex civilization with a variety of sub-cultures. Yet the general Chinese orientation—in contrast to the multitude of intellectual-philosophical-religious systems in the Western tradition—has been characterized by notably great homogeneity and consistency within itself. The way of life implicit in the term "Chinese"—the very egocentrism which has been able, in all seriousness, to label China the "Middle Kingdom"—has been as baffling as it has been intriguing to foreigners. One has only to ponder the paradox: the proportion of Western missionaries converted, in the broad sense, to Chinese culture as compared with the Chinese converted, in the specific sense, to Christian ethics.

Belief, written language, culture, custom, cuisine—and pride in all these—have been more tightly woven together in China than in any other country of Asia. Diluted though the classical culture of many modern Chinese has become, the essential tradition of Chineseness continues visible and viable. Stronger than any contemporary political tension, mature enough to bridge diverse regional and linguistic barriers within China—the totality of the Chinese tradition persists today in the carriage, the confidence, and the condescension of the new Communist rulers in the old capital of Peking. And it is in this critical sector — the restoration of self-respect to China as a distinctive cultural entity and as a modern nation—that the Chinese Communists appear to have attained significant success.

The drastic alteration which Mao Tse-tung has imposed upon China makes it superficial, however, to view the present Communist revolution as a transitory phase in China's long evolution. Communism is more than a thin, modern veneer glued over the heavy, ancient timbers of Chinese tradition. It is more than an external bureaucratic coating of political formula, designed to conceal dry rot and structural imperfections. Communism is a totally new element in Chinese experience: a bold attempt to introduce a new synthesis into the life and culture of a great people.

Chinese Communism denies the essential standards of classical Chinese civilization: equilibrium and stability. Chinese Communism is an absolute, proselytizing philosophy which aims at basic transformation of both individual and society. It has no conscience as to ends and means: its moral imperative is service to the cause of Communism. It sees no inconsistency in the creation of human hatred and misery in the alleged attempt to promote universal peace and welfare, or in feigning cooperation to further corruption. It has a malign mood which rejects the obligation to be reasonable, or even agreeable, except in accordance with its own selfish desires. It is little concerned with accommodating itself to the world —but rather with changing the world by actively applying the categorical injunctions of its own dogma. It presumes to make ultimate its own standards of judgment of good and evil.

The prospect is not reassuring. With technological and psychological weapons unknown in the old China, Peking moves relentlessly to create the Chinese version of the organization man: the human being so perfectly synchronized with the party that he not only echoes but anticipates its bidding, the individual personality so well adjusted to his narrow cell that he no longer possesses either the wish or the will to escape.

SOME observers remain sanguine, resting their case on the premise that the most highly developed of all traditional Chinese art forms has been the plastic art of compromise. Others are more pessimistic about the final result of the encounter between the narrow inflexibility of Communist dogma and the energetic adjustability of the Chinese individual. For the present, one may only predict the eventual deformity of any Chinese Government which does not grow out of the nature of things in China and out of the integral character of the Chinese people.

In the sphere of world politics, the long-term issue is clear. The Chinese Communists are in competition with the rest of the world for paramount influence throughout Asia. This challenge will not respond easily to amateur methods on the part of its antagonists. Neither the repetition of anti-Communist slogans nor the intonation of pious declarations about the desirability of democracy in Asia will suffice. Since World War II, professional analysis in the West has confronted the problems created by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a super-power. Now, and in the years ahead, the emergence of Communist China as a major Asian power requires equally cool and critical estimates. Emotion in matters of international security is no substitute for intelligence, nor rigidity for prudence.

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In the Chaotic Period of "The Three Kingdoms," Liu Pei (161-223 A.D.)
Restored The Fallen Han Dynasty

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THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Past and Present

Is Mao Merely the Latest "Emperor" in China's Age-Old Cycle of Dynasties?

by JOHN K. FAIRBANK

HISTORICAL study, being an art, not a science, is edifying and sensitizing but not predictive. Western historians, who invariably see in modern China certain echoes of China's past, have always done so at the peril of wishful thinking. Thus in the 1920s, when warlordism was the order of the day, your Western pundit was eloquently reminded of similar periods of abject disunity in earlier epochs. Today, when a centralized authoritarianism has been suddenly reestablished, the startled historian is at once reminded of the despotic Legalist strain in the traditional Confucian Empire. Tomorrow, however, if freedom should unexpectedly break out in mainland China, your history professor would point to the individualist strain in the Confucian philosophical tradition. Americans would do well to study Chinese history, but not put their faith in any one historical view.

For myself, I think we can discern in Communist China today the unpredictable interaction of two main patterns—that of the traditional Chinese dynastic cycle and that of the worldwide response to Western nationalism and industrialism. Since no single monolithic theory covers the subject, one can trace out these patterns only by a mixture of theories.

Let us begin in the footsteps of the countless generations of Chinese chroniclers who have studied the rise and fall of dynasties. In China perhaps more than elsewhere, the historical fraternity has been tied to the leading strings of previous generations. Having in mind from early times the idea of a dynastic cycle, they compiled their chronicles on that assumption, got it firmly embedded in Chinese political thought, and so presumably influenced political practices. According to this standard pattern, derived from the political history of half a dozen principal dynasties since 221 B.C., Chinese Communism today, in its rise to power, may be compared to the previous dynasties through a series of phases:

PHASE ONE begins with a period of disorder, weakness of central administrative power, and also of leadership. The old regime, hamstrung by self-seeking among the official class, has been unable to meet its problem of maintaining order and a viable economy. Warlords have arisen in the various natural strategic regions of the Chinese subcontinent. Economic distress, exacerbated by natural calamity, has produced a disaffected peasantry and a frustrated local leadership, both ready to give their allegiance to a new regime.

The resulting domestic weakness, in the traditional Confucian view before modern times, naturally facilitates the aggression of outsiders. Indeed, until this century historians of the Middle Kingdom, which is what the Chinese call China, assumed that its destiny was settled within, that barbarians could invade the inner land only in proportion as its ruling dynasty had grown incompetent; in short, that aggression from without was a mere function of, and determined by, the rise and fall of unified central power within China. This tradition is antithetic to the modern Leninist view of imperialism as the overwhelming destroyer of local

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societies. The Chinese Communists today are obliged, in a most unpatriotic fashion, to put much greater weight on foreign influence, as a determinant of China's destiny, than their Confucian predecessors would have done. In Peking's propaganda today, imperialism is the great devil of modern Chinese history. This gives the West more credit than it deserves.

Phase Two in the traditional dynastic cycle is more fully congruent with the recent Communist record. In this phase, a new leadership appears under a unifying genius, a great man, who is able to bind to himself a devoted body of warriors and of scholar-administrators. He not only has exceptional qualities of determination (like Chiang Kai-shek), he also senses the need and feelings of the populace. His armies are not a scourge upon the people, but are drawn from the people and represent their interests. His strategy is not selfishly opportunist, but pursues a long-term program. Like his rivals, this new leader early lays claim to the central power, but he is able to win out over them because he "wins the hearts of the people." This essential act is evidenced by his being able to set up a territorial military base in a strategic region where he can acquire both soldiers and the food to feed them. Able and educated men are drawn to him, and he is able to rise above the warlord level by combining with his military power the rudiments of a civil administration. For the latter, there must be ideological underpinnings and sanctions, which can be provided only by the scholars. As the power of the new dynasty expands over the provinces of the Middle Kingdom, the combination of military strength, administrative efficiency, and ideological justification carries all before it with increasing momentum. The promise of peace and order in the land and official posts for the scholar class is now reinforced by a deeply ingrained bandwagon psychology.

In *Phase Three* the new dynasty, by achieving political unification, is also able to gain economic strength. It immediately sets underway a survey of the land and population as a basis for the levying of taxes, particularly from the agricultural mass. At the same time, it may find itself involved in conflict on the borders of China, as its influence is reasserted in neighboring lands. In a prolonged burst of creative energy, a new bureaucracy is recruited and indoctrinated, remnants of the opposition are destroyed or won over, and the history of the recent past or the preceding dynasty is compiled and interpreted to indicate factually how the Chinese people have again been saved by a new, vigorous and virtuous leadership.

IT SEEMS pretty plain that the Chinese Communists can qualify in many respects as a new dynasty, as Sinologists have been quick to point out the world over—the new leadership and its devoted followers, the territorial base with the manpower and food supply for the army, the recruitment and indoctrination of the new bureaucracy, and the ideological justification of the whole process are all quite visible. Many features of the current phase of consolidation are also reminiscent of earlier eras, and thus one may be led into contemplation of the later phases in the traditional cycle. Unfortunately, the Communist dynasty is scheduled on this basis to last for at least a century and undergo only gradually a progressive deterioration of morale and efficiency, as prosperity leads to increased problems of administration, and loyalty is supplanted by self-seeking among the bureaucrats.

Since the above pattern is mainly an armchair-historian's product, it is considerably vitiated by the historian's selectivity. As the Communist historical-propagandists are now demonstrating, selection of historical evidence can prove almost anything. Seeing Chinese Communism as merely another dynasty may be taken as a first stage of sophistication but certainly an inadequate one.

THE WESTERN VIEW

THE chief alternative to the traditional Confucian pattern applied above is, of course, a traditional Western one. Where the Confucian pattern was cyclical, the Western is based on the idea of linear progress (no doubt the two patterns can be put together to make a spiral). The expansion of the Atlantic community underlies this Western pattern, and since the Marxist-Leninist scheme was drawn up mainly with the expansion of Europe in mind, much of the colonial period fits into the categories of the Communist interpretation today. Here again certain phases may be distinguished:

In *Phase One,* the traditional Chinese state, being incompatible with the modern world, is attacked and mortally wounded by it. Over a period of a century from the 1840s to the 1940s, the Confucian order is progressively destroyed as a result of contact with the West. The imperial power as an administrative and military mechanism is discredited by Western firepower. The agrarian economy and the imperial fiscal system, based essentially on rural tax-gathering, are disrupted by the influx of Western trade and the eventual rise of modern industry. The emperor's prestige is dimmed by successful foreign aggression against the peripheral vassal states and eventually within spheres of influence in China proper. Efforts at self-defense on the part of the Confucian scholar-administrators—as by the adoption of the Western arms, technology, and industry — prove unavailing because the agrarian-bureaucratic society of China cannot modernize as rapidly as the Western nations are modernizing. China's old order is out of date, maladjusted, and unable to respond adequately and in time. Efforts to reform the administration while retaining its Confucian values are attempted, but they are foredoomed to failure.

In *Phase Two* of the Western impact on modern China, new dynamic elements of modernization are absorbed into the traditional Chinese society and begin

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to work their transformation. One of these is the Western type of nationalism—loyalty to state and country as a sovereign symbol in an international world of similar nations, leading to abandonment of the old faith in the Confucian relationships within the family and under the emperor. Naturally, the new nationalism has behind it a large backlog of ethnocentrism and xenophobia, suspicion of foreigners and devotion to things Chinese. The transformation from a culturalism (loyalty to the traditional Chinese culture and social order) to a more modern nationalism is not too difficult. It implies, however, the destruction of the alien Manchu dynasty.

Thus the revolutionary movement at the turn of the century finds a leader in the semi-foreignized and patriotic Sun Yat-sen, a Cantonese schooled partly in Hawaii and Hong Kong, who has imbibed the Western nationalist concept and has only minimal ties with the established order. As the latter proves increasingly ineffective, the republican revolutionary movement gains widespread support as a protest against alien Manchu rule. Yet when the republic is established in 1912, the revolutionists find that their chief bond is a negative one. They know what they are against in the present, but have discordant ideas for the future. Institutions—fiscal, legal, educational and administrative — are still inadequate to the needs of a modern nation. Since things military are perhaps the simplest to acquire and organize, the warlord armies dominate the scene and the humiliation of warlordism serves during more than a decade as a continuous spur to efforts at national salvation. Japanese aggression during World War I, when other powers are preoccupied, serves as a further spur. A nationalist movement emerges at the time of the Versailles Treaty and, within the following decade, brings the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek to power in the Nanking government.

IN this phase a similar new element has been injected into the Chinese scene, in the form of the idea of economic growth and development, particularly under state supervision and leadership. This economic growth has, of course, been a fact since the early foreign trade began to disrupt the traditional economy. China's great increase in population since the 18th Century has been a secular and not a cyclical change. The ingress of foreign transport in the form of the river and coastal steamship, followed by the early railroads, mines, and textile mills, all demonstrate the growth capacities of modern industrialization based on science and technology. The early reformers themselves attempt to achieve economic development under the banner of the traditional idea of strengthening the state. In the process, a new type of scholar, the scientific technician, emerges, and more specialized administrators are required to guide the multiform types of industrial effort. New financiers like T. V. Soong of Harvard and H. H. Kung of Cornell eventually serve the new Nanking regime, trained in Western methods of fiscal manipulation, and buttressed by their family relationships with the power-holder on the distaff side (emperors have customarily made use of their wives' relatives, who are dependent on them for power, while slaughtering their brothers, who are rivals).



Chiang Kai-shek—"Indomitable and Uninstructable"

Thus by the 1930s there develops the concept of rural reconstruction, the application of modern technology to the agrarian economy, a forerunner of part of our contemporary doctrine of economic development. While the Nanking regime achieves relatively little in this regard, its period of rule sees the concept take firm shape among Chinese patriots. As in so many other lines of modernization, the Western missionaries' interest in village reconstruction points the way to a new China in which missionaries will have no part.

Still another of the new elements from abroad which revolutionize the Chinese social order in the early part of this century is Western liberalism—a vague term at best, representing a body of concepts and practices from which China has made a rather fastidious selection. For example, the freedom of the individual from family controls has gone hand in hand with the denial of the authority of the sages in intellectual matters and of the Son of Heaven in politics. To some degree one may speak of the influx of the ideals of the French Revolution, remaking China a century afterward and preparing the ground for the subsequent wave of Marxism. Startling upsets

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and reversals now occur. Youth is honored over age, or at least youth is able to acquire the prestige of scholarship which age formerly monopolized. Egalitarianism likewise extols the common man, and the modern leader is able to convert the benevolent Confucian concern for the populace into the Marxist cult of the people. In this welter of changes, women as individuals are freed from the severe inequalities of their former status in the Confucian system. Here, then, under the general banner of liberalism, democracy, *laissez-faire*, and humanitarianism, emerge new values and new social groups, which have yet to be integrated into a new order.

Phase Three sees the putting together of these various elements, so briefly indicated above, under a new revolutionary order. Looking back over the last century, one can now see in retrospect the emergence of those new forces, methods, ideals, and social classes which served as raw material for the Communists. Patriotic youth are ready to sacrifice themselves to wipe out China's past humiliation and build a new nation. New classes of factory workers and treaty-port merchant capitalists have been created by economic growth. New social groups—emancipated women, soldiers possessed of a new social status, peasants ready to participate in political life, students ready to join a party — are now in being. The very multiplicity of these new elements creates a great need for a new unity under the banner of nationalism and industrialism.

WAS COMMUNISM INEVITABLE?

If one follows this Western-type pattern of unilinear social change in modern China, one may imperceptibly work his historical interpretation around to the false conclusion that Chinese Communism represents the inevitable current phase of China's modernization. This would be just as simple-minded as to conclude that it is merely another in a long succession of dynasties.

In actual fact, of course, historical trends seldom develop in straight lines and Mao Tse-tung's being in power today depends on at least two particular circumstances, among others: one, that Japan attacked and destroyed the more modern area of Kuomintang China; second, that Chiang Kai-shek, indomitable and uninstructable, developed in his long years on the mainland no rural reconstruction program such as has now been achieved on Taiwan. Peking naturally contends that historical necessity made Japan aggressive and Chiang blind to the agrarian revolution, but this hindsight overlooks the fact that historical trends are no one's monopoly and may be ridden by alternative power groups.

In some ways (but not others) the Kuomintang period may now be viewed, at the peril of distortion, as a partway stage toward the present regime. At least in respect of party government, the creation of a party army, the mobilization of youth, and the modernization of the economy, the Kuomintang took faltering steps down the road which the Communists have since traveled. Yet there is another element of the Kuomintang period which it would be a distortion to overlook—namely, the influx of Western ways and values under a government oriented primarily toward the Western democratic world, which I have tried to characterize above under the general term of liberalism. Thus if China under the Kuomintang seemed to move down the totalitarian road in politics, its cultural activity remained on the whole far different. (Let us not try, however, in this brief compass, to place the Kuomintang in Chinese history as well as Chinese Communism.) It is worth noting that the Marxist-Leninist dispensation in China as elsewhere has shown itself under pressure to pay lip service to certain liberal goals, even while trying to redefine them in its own interest of state power.

In the mixture of continuities and discontinuities which I have tried briefly to characterize, Peking today has a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideological orthodoxy as vigorous as Confucianism used to be; but it believes in progress toward a future millennium, not cyclical repetition descending from a past golden age. Dynastic absolutism has been replaced by party dictatorship, the scholar-elite by a party elite, Confucian classics by Communist classics, written examination by group discussions, scholarly self-cultivation by guilt-ridden self-criticism. Merchants continue to be disesteemed, being undoubtedly bourgeois, but soldiers are now glorified. The sages are class-angled and debunked. Sons are no longer filial but actually denounce their parents; labor heroes are the new models to emulate. Women do not aspire to lily feet but approach their romantic nadir, functional interchangeability with men. Responsibility for good conduct is still mutually shared among family and neighborhood groups, only now this ancient automatic check on deviance is extended to include the neighbors' thoughts. Villages still are mobilized for public works, but the state philosophy of seeking harmony with nature has given way to the industrial urge to conquer nature. Values have undergone a profound transformation, at least on the surface. Government used to be thinly spread out and superficial and the peasant passive, a sub-political animal. Today the government penetrates every village and hut, and peasants are people, unless they misbehave. There is a remarkable spirit of change and innovation. Even the Chinese written characters are to be simplified and writing eventually alphabetized—the greatest cultural change since the standardization of the script in the era of the First Emperor.

By selecting, as it is any observer's right, certain elements among these confusing echoes and paradoxes, one may construct an historical base for China's future—indeed, we may have as many futures as there are observers.

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"PERSUADING" SIX HUNDRED MILLION: I

Rule by Brute Reason

Hypnotic Indoctrination, Not Naked Force, Binds China's Masses to the Regime

by RICHARD HUGHES

PERSUASION rather than compulsion is the ruling disciplinary influence inside China today. Mao Tse-tung's Communism is now animated by the "brute reason" which, non-party member Oscar Wilde protested, "hit below the intellect" and was far more unbearable than brute force.

The preliminary stage of physical terrorism and mass executions appears, on all the evidence, to have passed and to have been succeeded, gently but implacably, by—to Western minds—the more terrifying stage of irresistible mass mental pressure. No Chinese today is forced to do anything; he is persuaded to follow a course of action which, as a reasonable and patriotic Chinese, he must recognize, sooner or later, to have been not only a course which even more reasonable and patriotic Chinese have selflessly recommended for his and the State's benefit, but also a course which, he now remembers, he had previously if dimly envisaged himself. No one else has really "brainwashed" him; he holds the reddened sponge and soap in his own gratified hands.

There should be no surprise at this second stage in the evolution of Chinese Communizing. Mao's long-range strategy in war or ideology has invariably set store on words rather than blows. "Correct leadership," as he blandly advised a rally of Heroes of Labor, "can be developed only on the principle of 'from the masses to the masses'; this means summing up the *views* of the masses, then taking the resultant *ideas* back to the masses, and explaining and popularizing them until the masses embrace the ideas as their own." Or again: "It is not easy to liquidate these things and sweep them clean; we must do it properly: in other words, we must use persuasive reasoning. If our reasoning is persuasive and to the point, it will be effective. In reasoning, we must begin by administering a shock and shouting at the patient, 'You are ill!' so that he is frightened into a sweat, and then we tell him gently that he needs treatment."

The miracle of organization involved in Chinese farm collectivization is an instructive case in point. Mao decided suddenly—by inspiration or knowledge or both—that the time had come to achieve full collectivization. There had been a prolonged, six-year softening-up of the peasants, with mutual-aid teams and mild-spoken propagandists leisurely sowing the seed of gradual farm cooperativism. But in July, 1955, Mao (whose favorite political maxim is said to be: "Go slow at first but fast at the end") decreed spring sowing in 1957 as the seemingly impossible deadline for enlistment of China's 500 million peasants into collective-farming units. Approximately 90 percent of this prodigious enrollment has already been achieved—and, on the surface, achieved peacefully and voluntarily. No one has been ordered to join a cooperative unit; indeed, there are stubborn individualists who are still holding aloof. But the diehards are virtually ostracized, their prices and returns are not as rewarding as the working results of the conformists, and the moral (if the word may be misused) pressure on them to follow the communal lead and example is well-

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nigh irresistible. (There were three rugged non-conformists on the collective farm of 400 members which I visited, but they were clearly weakening—the more so because they were not being physically persecuted but merely left alone as anti-social eccentrics.)

The miracle was achieved by what is probably history's greatest feat of mass persuasion. Hordes of trained activists, leavened always by loyal local cadres, summoned meetings, day and night, at the lowest village levels and by sheer force of "brute reason," sustained by party chapter and verse, Oriental logic and (in all fairness) agricultural common sense, persuaded the peasants that it would be to their personal advantage, as well as to the benefit of the State, to join the cooperatives. There appear to have been no direct threats; there was just endless talk, talk, talk, until—sometimes, it is alleged, by actual physical exhaustion—lingering doubters and dissenters yielded and threw in their lot with the majority.

This triumph of sweet but ruthless reasonableness, it must be stressed, is still basically one of organization. If the pledged improvements in agricultural production and returns are not forthcoming, a catastrophic explosion is possible. But so wretched were the previous conditions of the Chinese peasants that the most cautious observers in Peking today are constrained to admit that skilled coordination and scientific farming methods, under shared communal control, must inevitably raise standards. It is an ironic fact that, under capitalist rule in Malaya's segregated anti-Communist villages and on farms in the Hong Kong New Territories, greatly improved results have followed the genuinely voluntary adoption of similar collective methods in Asian farming and marketing.

Mao Tse-tung, all admit, knows and understands his peasants profoundly, however unsure and uneasy he and his top party brass may privately be about factory workers in general and of unpredictable and rambunctious Shanghai in particular. He is perhaps the one man who knows how far, how soon and how deeply Chinese farming collectivization may be pressed. Until now, at any rate, his judgment and sense of timing on peasants' reactions have been completely correct. His tremendous personal popularity has never been in doubt and seems to become stronger as he makes "persuasion do the work of fear."

THE Peking regime is essentially and unprecedentedly flexible and realistic. When it was discovered that overprecise rulings on production policy under collectivization had led to embarrassing deficiencies in subsidiary but vital farm sidelines like pigs, poultry and peasant handicrafts, the cooperative methods were immediately relaxed, members were urged to indulge in the sidelines on a non-cooperative, personal-profit basis, and the free market in vegetables, meat and fish was encouraged to expand. There was a proud official party-line announcement from Peking in February, which would have given perplexed pause to Comrade Lenin, that *one-third* of all China's agricultural produce is now being sold on the free market—*i.e.*, in open capitalist competition with the State stores.

THE RAMBUNCTIOUS WORKER

ON the swelling industrial front, it is more difficult to offer even tentative opinion on the success of Chinese persuasion in shaping a dependable robot mentality among workers. China now has a full-time labor force of approximately 25 million, which increased by nearly 2.5 million last year. It has been officially admitted that this increase was "double actual requirements," reflected "lack of investigation and study of actual needs of the national economy" and "squandered the nation's resources." However, apart from economics and managerial mismanagement, here is a new huge and growing urban class, largely alien to, or unfamiliar with, the ideas and experience of the ruling Mao junta, which is more accustomed to village horizons and the Yenan caves. The workers, generally, enjoy far better housing and living standards than the farmers. Those who live in Shanghai are especially suspect in Peking because of anxieties over old lingering infections from Western barbarism, capitalist freebooting and independent "subjective" thinking in the great seaport. It was, in fact, originally intended by the party that Shanghai should be allowed to wither on the vine; its factories were to be dispersed, with "voluntary" mass transfers of workers, to new inland industrial centers. But Mao, with characteristic decision, reversed party policy at a momentous day-and-night conference in February last year, and today the visitor, from the 14th floor of the Park Hotel, overlooking the most un-Asian city skyline in all China, can survey the spreading march of new factory chimneys from the outskirts of the six-million-peopled city—light industry to the west, heavy industry to the east.

Undoubtedly the regime remains jittery about Shanghai. I queried Public Security Bureau officials in Shanghai about a curious official directive, republished under their authority in the Peking press in November last year, calling imperatively for "mobilization of all organs of the Bureau" and "an alerting of all loyal people" to counteract "sabotage activities of spies and counter-revolutionaries, the distribution of reactionary handbills and placards in government departments, schools and factories, and disturbances by employees because of dissatisfaction with wages, amenities and the distribution of necessities." The two Public Security officials, tough but polite and uncomfortable, assured me earnestly, in conference in the old French Club, that these references were all wrong, and then—when I objected incredulously, with literal quotations—that they had been poorly and misleadingly translated. The only reasonable conclusion I could draw was in agreement with what had been hinted

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

"Patriotic Capitalist" signing over his holdings to the regime

to me by Western residents in Peking: that Public Security feels so insecure about the Shanghai worker that a Bureau directive may be anxiously rushed out one week and just as anxiously deprecated next week.

Nonetheless, the honest if fleeting reporter must testify that there is no surface justification in the crowded Shanghai streets for this Public Security anxiety and vacillation. For a Western visitor, the Shanghai of today, compared with the glittering Shanghai which I remember in 1940, is dull, drab and besmogged with the puritanical joylessness and the holier-than-thou righteousness of Communist China; but for the average Chinese worker, it is a far better, healthier and happier city. There are no diseased beggars, professional cripples, child prostitutes or short-lived rickshaw coolies. There are patches, but not rags. No one starves to death in the streets. So, Communist ideology or not, there arises the perpetual conundrum for the Westerner in China today: Who can attempt to balance loss of freedom of thought for a minority against loss of fear of starvation for the majority?

Whatever the Peking Communists have done to the mind of the Chinese woman, their offense against her appearance and feminimity is atrocious. The "progressive" Chinese woman today must dress and work and look like a man. She has certainly been emancipated; there are women ministers, judges, doctors and teachers, as well as women laborers, tram-drivers and street-cleaners. Her feet may have been unbound but they have been thrust into men's boots to emphasize the reform. Her mind and behavior are taken pretty good care of. There are the Local Street Committees and the Workers' Families Committees for housewife or woman worker to cooperate in communal service or neighborly interference, and over all is the All-China Federation of Democratic Women.

This women's surveillance service is again persuasive. Comrade Yang, the gentle, homely little woman who controls the Shanghai Reformatory for Prostitutes, was astonished when I inquired about the "arrest" of the handful of girls who still trickle into the reformatory. They are never "arrested," she explained: they "volunteer" to enter after neighbors or friends have reported their delinquency to the authorities, and first the Local Street Committee, then their friends, family and relatives, and finally —if necessary—the police have plagued them with continued and tireless "persuasion" to "volunteer" for reformatory treatment. (The average term of reformation is 18 months; Comrade Yang was most grateful when I asked her whether she had studied the results of Empress Theodora's similar experiment, and said that she would certainly consult the history books immediately.)

CHINA's intellectuals, writers, artists and scholars are in a sad way. Following the still mysterious fate of the disgraced and purged Hu Feng and his "nihilistic and pro-Western" clique, a blight stunted all Chinese artistic and creative effort. Then Chairman Mao launched last year his celebrated crusade to "let flowers of all kinds blossom together." It is too early yet to evaluate the results of this crusade in persuasion on the intellectual front. Most scholars, it does seem, remain wary about advancing new ideas or exploiting new techniques. There is a strong tendency to let someone else stick his honorable neck out first. Not a single magazine is issued which does not contain party propaganda. (I asked Dr. Feng Yeh-chi, editor of *China Literature*, a charming and cultivated scholar, whether he would publish any criticism of Mao Tse-tung in the next issue of his magazine. He was genuinely taken aback: "But what possible criticism could validly be offered against Chairman Mao?")

A writer still depends on the Federation of Writers for publication: as an approved member, he receives a salary or a grant while he labors on his "blossoming-flowers"

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work, for which he also receives royalties; as a non-member, whether he carefully chooses the flowers that blossom or not, he must find his own publisher and drum up his own readers, without salary or grant. Here is clearly still a combination of brute force and brute reason.

However, in this mellowed climate of persuasion, there does appear to have been, on the current evidence of Peking newspaper editorials and official reports, a development of "uneasy thoughts" among students and young members of the Agricultural Producer Cooperatives. "Uneasy thoughts" apparently cover a multitude of deviations. There is, for example, *(vide Jen Min Jih Pao)* the sin of "ultra-democracy," which evidently means an unreasonable disposition to challenge the omniscience of the party boss on the farm. And in the universities and schools, there are distressing tendencies "to ignore politics," "to confuse socialist democracy and bourgeois democracy" and "to consider one-sided publicity on the question of fostering individuality, liberalism and individual wishes" (*vide* official reports of discussions at recent educational conferences in Peking and Tientsin). It would be encouraging to attribute the last-listed errors and omissions to popular reaction on Hungary, but the blunt fact is that—irrespective of brute force or brute reason, persuasion or compulsion—Chinese students, like all literate Chinese, can now read only the party line on Hungary. Still, there is certainly substance for the belief that, in the universities and among intelligent youth generally, some officially undesirable stinkwort and poison ivy is shyly appearing among the blossoming flowers.

LIBERTY—WHENEVER AND WHATEVER

THE success which the regime has had in persuading capitalist owners and business managers to cooperate, as reasonable men, in the seizure, absorption and now operation of their former industries and factories is surely final and decisive victory for brute reason. It may be argued, of course, that the former owners had no choice; and that they have, after all, been guaranteed a return of five percent on the value and earnings of their property, under the new "joint" control, for a period of from five to seven years. (This indulgence never occurred to Comrades Lenin and Trotsky.) But this is to ignore the earnestness, eloquence and self-dedication with which they protest to visitors their satisfaction at the loss of their property, their loyalty and gratitude to the new bosses, their burning preference for Communist control. It is frightening to listen to long-sentence political offenders in Peking's show-prison (1,200 men, 40 women) flagellate themselves, denounce their enormities and laud their jailers; but there are undertones of horror and nausea in the grovelling homage of dispossessed but able, intelligent and physically free men to the superior administrative ability and intrinsic honesty of their dispossessors, whom they are assiduously aiding and abetting in the management and operation of their stolen enterprises.

All of which inevitably raises the question of the sincerity and endurance of this apparent submission to relentless persuasion and brute reason. Will the new, unnatural mental mould prove hard and lasting?

There are those who have always contended that the Chinese are "too individualistic" to become durable Communists, who argue that, with their traditional subtlety and expedient patience, they will baffle and absorb their latest ideological conquerors just as they defeated all their former alien invaders, imperialists and missionaries. Their present surface acquiescence, these optimists argue, is only an act; come the appointed day, and they will miraculously arise, throw off the Red yoke and regain their liberty—whatever and whenever that was.

HERE there is certainly good honest ground for speculation and discussion. But the argument is somehow reminiscent of the curious old myths that the Chinese were all fatalistic and—like all true Orientals—always impassive and unemotional. The visitor must recognize the frustrating sound barrier of the language; he knows that his travels and contacts are limited and supervised; he is a fool if he thinks that he can get close personally to any Chinese as individuals; he will insist that his impressions must be fragmentary and superficial. But, if he is an honest and objective reporter, he must testify that the great mass of the Chinese people he sees in the streets of the great cities, in the trains and on the nearer farms seem well-fed, contented and happy. Communism certainly has not yet spoiled or even adulterated the innate friendliness, charm, human perverseness and generous instincts of the Chinese race. (The head boy on my floor in Shanghai's Old Cathay Mansions politely but adamantly refused a gratuity from me, but because I had a bad attack of quinsy when I left spontaneously pressed upon me the gift of a bottle of Chinese herbal medicine.)

This, then, is something new and revolutionary in world revolutions. Mao's regime came to power as a well-organized and loyal team. It has suffered no internal schisms and is seemingly not weakened by personal rivalries. Its elderly and venerated leaders are not challenged by the uprise of a new generation with new names and new claims for a share in power and policy.

Maybe, given a strong government, the Chinese people after past disunity and corrupt or inefficient governments, will prove to be the ideal mass for Communism—especially now that the shrewd line of calculated persuasion has supplanted naked compulsion, and hypnotic indoctrination from *within* has replaced open direction from the *top*. It is not just the harsh difference between compulsion and persuasion; it is also the subtle difference between argument and persuasion: *On peut convaincre les autres par ses propres raisons; mais on ne les persuade que par les leurs.*

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"PERSUADING" SIX HUNDRED MILLION: 2

How Peking Reaches So Many

by CHAO KUO-CHUN

WHEN A NATION of 600 million suddenly bursts forth into tremendous organized energy after being regarded for centuries as a "sheet of loose sand," the total effect cannot be measured by tangible means nor can mere words and statistics adequately convey what is happening. But even in statistical terms we can measure Peking's mass mobilization of national energy sufficiently to refute those who have concluded, in some mystical way, that the Chinese national character is unsuited to highly-disciplined centralized activity.

Consider, for example, 120 million youth planting six million acres of trees in a national afforestation program in 1955; 70 million peasant boys making 400 million tons of compost in the "Accumulate Fertilizer" movement; or 764,000 women serving in cadres of the All-China Federation of Women. We cannot take the regime's statistics at face value, of course, but it cannot be denied, on the basis of available published evidence and neutral eye-witness reports, that the regime has in fact devised effective techniques for mobilizing disciplined mass support at the rice-roots level. Indeed, for all the importance of other bases of power, such as the huge military establishment, it is Peking's myriad network of mass organizations which provides a key to the strength of its totalitarian machinery. Strategic groups such as students, workers, intellectuals and peasant youth appear to be supporting the regime through the channel of the mass organizations.

The term "mass organization" is used here to refer to the nationwide organizations in China that enroll and control a great multitude of people, but are not a part of the formal structure of either the government or a political party. These mass organizations are set up according to vocational lines (labor unions, peasant organizations, federations of merchants and industrialists, associations of professional people), age groups (youth league and children's corps), sex (women's federation), or such miscellaneous activity as athletic associations and village "cultural" clubs. In this manner, practically everyone in China is reached by at least one such organization, and multiple membership, especially for the "activists," is quite common. Since the total estimated membership of the mass organizations must be numbered in the hundreds of millions, we can conclude, in fact, that most adults in mainland China belong to two or more such organizations.

The dates of the founding of the major mass organizations show both the relative importance assigned by party and regime to the respective social groups and the degree of party penetration in these groups. Thus, national organizations which supported Peking programs were set up for workers, students, women and youth around 1949, while the businessmen were not organized until the fall of 1953. In nearly all cases, however, members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are in control. The strategic role played by the mass organizations in the over-all plans of the CCP is reflected in an article in the *Cheng-chih hsüeh-hsi* (Political Study) of October 13, 1956, which states:

> There are many ways for the party to rally the masses around it. Besides direct contact with the masses through party members and party organizations at all levels, an

Chinese opera speaks for the regime

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important method is to keep in touch with them through mass organizations, because the scope of such organizations and their activities is extremely wide.

Leninist "democratic centralism" facilitates effective control of the vast number of people in the mass organizations. The leaders can have firm control and veto power over the programs as well as the personnel at all lower levels. Individual members have a voice in the basic units such as a school branch of the Youth League or a trade-union unit in a factory. But at higher levels, authority is vested in an executive committee or a secretariat.

This vertical control by the top leadership is complemented by horizontal interlocking directorships and by party instructions binding upon its members. Thus Liao Ch'eng-chih, a member of the CCP Central Committee, holds at least five concurrent posts: Chairman, Federation of Democratic Youth; Vice-Chairman, Youth League; Vice-Chairman, National Committee for the Protection of Children; Member, Standing Committee, Committee on World Peace; and Member, Executive Committee, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Government and CCP control of the mass organizations is further reinforced by constant absorption and recruitment for the party from the ranks of energetic and ambitious organization activists.

The mass organizations perform a variety of political, economic, social and cultural functions—ranging, in the case of trade unions, from organizing "labor emulation" contests to assuring labor discipline and fulfillment of production targets. To strengthen member loyalty, activities are focused on personal welfare or professional interests, such as trade-union technical training and, in the case of women's groups, birth-control classes. In 1955 there were, according to official data, 9,854 spare-time technical schools with a total enrollment of 2.8 million, not only imparting new skills but aiding job promotion.

THE mass organizations, of course, must above all propagate official policies as the regime's primary agencies of mass indoctrination. The propaganda onslaught makes the social pressure for conformity acute, and even many who are lukewarm toward the activities of the mass organizations are swept along with the activists. To reach the people the mass organizations use not only such familiar communications media as printed materials, radio broadcasts, loudspeakers, movies and slides, but also old indigenous popular forms, including Chinese "opera," ballads and native dances like the *yangko*. The scope of the propaganda effort can be seen in "house organ" circulation figures for 1955: *The China Youth* (semi-monthly), 1.76 million; *Boys and Girls of China* (weekly), 1.8 million; *Workers' Daily*, 150,000; *Workers' Semi-Monthly*, 100,000; *Women of New China* (monthly), 300,000; and *Youth Journal* (tri-weekly), 480,000.

The mass organizations employ, furthermore, a host of socio-psychological techniques to overcome strong resistance from traditional institutions. These "tradition breaking" programs include the campaign to get peasant women to attend village schools and the propagation of birth-control methods. The power of the state as such could not effect basic social changes without the reiteration of rational justifications by the mass agencies—"sacrifice today for a beautiful tomorrow" or "work hard to build a prosperous, peaceful China"; the bestowal of labor hero titles to outstanding workers; use of children to persuade their parents to support government policies, and contact with family members of students who are in Western countries for persuading them to return.

In the long run, Peking's ability to overcome China's traditional social structure may well determine the stability of the regime. Unlike Japan, which superimposed new technology on its existing social structure, or India with its co-existence of atomic reactors and caste, Peking has deliberately fashioned unprecedented totalitarian machinery to minimize the dichotomy between old and new.

Principal Mass Organizations in China

Name	*Membership* (in millions)
All-China Federation of Trade Unions	13 (1955)
Communist Youth League	20 (August, 1956)
All-China Federation of Women	76 (1953)
All-China Federation of Youth	31 plus (1956, including Youth Leaguers)
All-China Federation of Cooperative Workers	162 plus (1956)
All-China Students' Federation	4 (1955)
Children's Pioneer Corps of China	10 (1955)
Sino-Soviet Friendship Association	68 (1953)

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"PERSUADING" SIX HUNDRED MILLION: 3

Brainwashing in Perspective

A Psychiatrist Interprets Peking's "Thought Reform"

—Group Psychotherapy To Save Your Soul

by DR. ROBERT J. LIFTON

PERHAPS more than any regime in history, Communist or otherwise, the present Chinese Government has energetically and ingeniously devoted itself to the "changing" of human beings. Its methods for altering individual thoughts and emotions have been popularly termed "brainwashing"—a word which has become surrounded with an aura of fear and mystery, leaving in its wake a loose body of comment, polemic and tongue-in-cheek humor.

But the process which gave rise to this concern and confusion is very much a reality. Known by the Chinese themselves as *szu-hsiang kai-tsao* (variously translated as "ideological remolding," "ideological reform," and "thought reform"), it combines a remarkably widespread dissemination with a focused emotional power. Even a brief examination of this basic ingredient of Chinese Communism reveals much about the nature of the regime, something about Chinese culture, and perhaps a bit about human beings in general.

Thought reform has received most publicity when applied, often accompanied by physical abuse, to such groups as American prisoners of war and other incarcerated Westerners. Yet far more important is its use among the Chinese people themselves—in universities and schools, in special "revolutionary colleges," in government and business offices, in prisons, and in labor and peasant groups. There are probably few persons throughout mainland China who have not in some way participated in it; but the intellectuals have been subjected to its most intensive and elaborate versions, and it is their experiences that I will discuss here.

What is the "philosophy," the Communist justification of thought reform? Although Chinese Communist theorists rarely refer to details of manipulative techniques, they do put forth an elaborate rationale, which is forcefully presented to every participant during a preliminary stage in his personal "reform."

In brief, the argument runs this way: the "old society" (everything predating Communist rule, but particularly the Nationalist period) was evil and corrupt; this was so because it was dominated by the "exploiting classes"—the landowners and the bourgeoisie; most intellectuals come from these "exploiting classes" (or from the closely-related petite bourgeoisie) and therefore retain "evil remnants" of their origins and of the old regime; each must now rid himself of these "ideological poisons" in order to become a "new man" in the "new society." Mao Tse-tung has compared the process to a medical problem, referring to "diseases in thought and politics" which require "an attitude of saving men by curing their diseases." What we see as a set of coercive maneuvers, the Communists present as a morally uplifting, harmonizing, and therapeutic experience.

But the program has also had immediate goals of a highly practical nature: the consolidation of the new

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regime and the rallying of the Chinese people behind its policies, the training of new personnel, the undermining or conversion of all opposition (real or imagined —past, present or potential); and in the service of these, the establishment of close control over individual behavior and thought. Here is clearly an expression of totalitarianism, an arbitrary policy in a monolithic state; but it is at the same time the product of a powerful ideological movement, a pseudo-religious mystique which creates both the demand and the emotional fervor.

ORWELL ONE BETTER

WHATEVER its setting, thought reform consists of two closely related elements: *confession,* the detailed recitation of past evil accompanied by the promise of humble service to the regime in the future; and *reeducation,* the attempt of remaking a man in the Communist image. Both are always present, although one may take precedence over the other. During the national Ideological Remolding Movement of 1951-52, the old professor was required to recant, but not necessarily expected to "change"; the young student in the same campaign had not as much to confess—more important for him was his reeducation. Confession and reeducation were combined with greatest intensity in the "revolutionary colleges," unique indoctrination centers set up all over China for diverse groups of intellectuals at the time of the Communist takeover.

What are the most important psychological features of thought reform? I have drawn most of my illustrations from the six-month course conducted at the revolutionary college, but the basic principles apply wherever the process takes place.

The *control of the milieu* is the psychological foundation upon which thought reform always operates. So complete is the manipulative power of the Communist officials running a revolutionary college that they can not only control all events, but also create and change at will the general atmosphere which prevails. They set up at the beginning an open, democratic milieu which encourages free discussion and contributes to a high *esprit de corps.* When they feel the moment is at hand, they bring about a gradual closing in of the environment, greater pressures upon the students for full confessions and "progressive" (or Marxist) expression. They accomplish this atmospheric change through their instructions to the student leaders of the small study groups who report to them daily, and to other "activists" whose relationship to them is more covert.

In the face of these manipulations, the student finds the emphasis shifting from the intellectual to the personal, such that he, rather than the Marxist doctrine, becomes the object of study. Everything he says, does, or even feels may be noted by his fellow students and reported back to faculty officials, who may in turn use this information to devise specific measures geared to his personal susceptibilities. All of the information which he receives is increasingly limited to the Communist point of view. More important, the entire environment becomes so mobilized that it will psychologically nourish him only when he is meeting its demands, and consistently undermine him when he fails to do so. He finds, more and more, that his own inner life becomes indistinguishable from the message of his environment. As one student described it:

> Using the same pattern of words for so long, you are so accustomed to them that you feel chained. If you make a mistake, you make it within that pattern. Although you don't admit that you have adopted this kind of ideology, you are actually using it subconsciously, almost automatically. . . . Such was the state of confusion in my own mind that I couldn't tell or make out what were the things I believed.

It is this airtight control of communication which gives thought reform its awesome effect upon the individual. It is in many ways similar to what George Orwell so brilliantly envisioned in his novel, *Nineteen Eighty-Four.* Orwell, with the mind of a Westerner, saw milieu control accomplished through mechanical means, the two-way "telescreen." But the Chinese have here established an entirely *human* recording and transmitting apparatus, one which therefore reaches more deeply into the student's intellectual and emotional life. It is this human form of milieu control, practiced throughout China on a less intensive basis, which explains the Communists' ability to maintain such intimate individual supervision over their sprawling population without benefit of an advanced mechanical communication system.

CRUCIAL also to thought reform is the stimulation of both a *sense of guilt* and a *sense of shame.* Each student is constantly criticizing others and being criticized himself; each is required to lay himself bare—to state verbally and in writing his political, social and personal attitudes, past and present. He must particularly dig out his "errors," his "reactionary" tendencies and affiliations, his maltreatment of others. One student vies to outdo the other in lurid details; one group challenges another to match its collective confessions.

The man who fails to confess fully, or in any way resists his reform, is labelled a "lagging-behind element." He soon finds himself the special target of heated rebuke from the other members of his group, and a victim of social ostracism. He may in some cases be offered a special opportunity for public repentance: a pre-arranged, revivalist-like gathering at which he dramatically recites his past evils, expresses relief at "washing away all of my sins," and gratitude toward The

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Government for allowing him to "become a new man." The rare student who is truly recalcitrant, hopelessly "backward," is subjected to the ultimate indignity: denunciation by faculty members, cadres and fellow-students at a mass "struggle" meeting, before hundreds or even thousands of people. It becomes clear that his future in Communist China is indeed precarious: the ceremony serves as a grim warning for other students of questionable standing.

This accusatory atmosphere and stress upon personal evil brings out feelings of sinfulness and expectations of punishment—or a sense of guilt. The pressures toward isolation and public humiliation cause a loss of "face"—of social recognition, prestige, and self-esteem—all contributing to a sense of shame. As a student expressed it to me, "You are alone and you suffer if you do not believe."

In other words, however ethical and honest a man has been, thought reform can make him feel guilty and shamed. It can revive the store of guilt and shame present in all of us, as a consequence of both our childhood transgressions and our adult limitations. It is an environment specially geared to mobilize such feelings, as *everyone* is made to experience them—and indeed one *must* experience them if one is to be accepted.

All of this produces one particularly important result: as guilt and shame mount within, the student comes to feel that his fears and conflicts, in fact all of his emotional pain, are caused by his own evil and worthlessness. He begins to believe that he is deserving of any punishment the group may impose, and feels really in need of reform. At this point, he can solve his dilemma only through the prescribed confession method—finding in it an outlet for the pressure valves of guilt and shame, and at the same time a necessary act of self-surrender, in coming to terms with a demanding milieu.

As a means of furthering this adjustment, the Communists apply their own system of *psychological analysis*. Since this is conducted in small six-to-ten-man study groups (known throughout China as *hsueh hsi*), the individual student finds himself involved in a special form of group psychotherapy. Not only is he expected to express "spontaneously" all of his shortcomings, but also to seek interpretations for them or accept the interpretations of others. He must search for their origins in his own family, educational and social background. His "insight" in such a *self-criticism* is of course highly slanted and virtually the same in all cases. He finds that his deficiency—whether it is the character trait of "individualism," "erroneous" political thinking, or rude manners—is caused by "ruling class" or "bourgeois" influences derived from early life, and especially from his class origin.

As in most situations where a man is under psychological "treatment," he must be willing to expose himself completely and hold nothing back. He is expected to go beyond mere mouthing of Communist views and become emotionally involved in the process, lest he be exposed as a "false progressive." Even his relations with the opposite sex must be discussed in the group and evaluated in terms of their effect upon the treatment goal —his personal reform. If a relationship, in the judgment of the group, enhances his "progress," it is encouraged; if it seems to hold him back, he is advised to break it off.

National Day Parade, Peking, 1956

The student who shows signs of confusion or of resistance is said to have a "thought problem." He is likely to be approached by more progressive students or by faculty representatives who urge him to "talk it over" and offer him help in working it out. Similarly, should he show signs of stress and report to the school physician with such symptoms as insomnia, headache or fatigue, these will probably be recognized as psychosomatic in origin. He will be told, as was a student I interviewed: "There is nothing wrong with your body. It must be your thoughts that are sick. You will feel better when you have solved your problems and completed your reform." In all cases, inner conflict is encouraged, as long as it is solved in a reform-oriented manner.

The *hsueh hsi* group is thus armed with a psychological theory which attributes all personal traits to class origin. It is a theory with questionable validity in our

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eyes, but when supported by the entire environment, it can be made an effective weapon. The group is also fortified by a highly-charged morality and an absolute doctrinal authority for the "correctness" of all of its solutions. In the face of this combined approach, the individual student must inevitably find it very difficult to maintain a dissenting opinion, especially in a Chinese culture which has always stressed group harmony at the expense of individualistic achievement. Again, he begins to interpret any confusion or disagreement with the group as *his* problem, and accepts the principle that it is *he* who must give way and "change."

It would be highly misleading to assume that thought reform consists exclusively of painful experiences; it contains powerful *emotional appeals* and meaningful psychological satisfactions as well. If a Chinese intellectual is able to accept its principles, it can supply him with a profoundly binding set of group affiliations—in his small group and in the vast Communist movement. It encourages and mobilizes nationalistic sentiments, and can for many restore pride in being Chinese. The student may experience great relief at giving up his individual struggles, merging with an all-powerful force, and thereby sharing its strength. He is fortified by an ideology which justifies all that is done, answers all questions, leaves no problem unsolved. And perhaps most important of all, he shares the powerful bond of participation in a great "moral crusade"—reforming himself, reforming others about him, reforming society, joining in the "struggle for peace," "the brotherhood of man," and "the great Communist future."

In its pressures and appeals, thought reform seeks to do more than impose a set of authoritarian rules. It aims at bringing about a profound inner change in the individual student, particularly in his feeling of who and what he is in relationship to people around him, or in his *sense of inner identity*. The events of the 20th Century, and particularly during the years prior to the Communist takeover, had placed a great strain upon the Chinese intellectual, and had caused him much confusion concerning his position in the family and in society. The old stress upon absolute family loyalty and filial piety had been long under attack, and many Chinese intellectuals found themselves wavering between the conflicting roles of the modern rebellious reformer and the more traditional filial son. This conflict was magnified for most of them by their disaffection from the former regime.

Thought reform supplies each student with a dramatic solution to this dilemma through the symbolic climax of the process—the denunciation of the father. Each must expose and attack his father's political, social and economic abuses, as well as his individual shortcomings, denouncing him both as a person and as a representative of the exploiting classes. He is likely to find this the most painful demand of his thought reform, and may require endless prodding, persuasion or indirect threat before he is able to take the crucial step. But he has little choice and he almost invariably complies. In this act he is renouncing the symbol of the old order and the mainspring of his traditional identity—that of the filial son—in order to make way for a new allegiance and a new identity—that of the zealous adherent of the Communist regime. And to his new affiliation he is expected to bring his old sense of loyalty and "correct" behavior.

This shift is most readily accomplished in younger students, those in their post-adolescence or early adulthood, as this is normally a period of identity crisis and a time when the individual is most susceptible to ideological or religious conversion. But every student is expected to undergo a symbolic death—a break with his family and his past—and a near-mystical rebirth, his union with The Government and The People. Only through such an emotional experience—through some shift in inner identity—is he likely to experience a true change in his beliefs.

In sum, thought reform makes use of a powerful combination of emotional forces in the total manipulation of the individual participant. It employs no theologians, but it closely resembles an attempt at induced religious conversion—saving souls, stressing guilt and shame, demanding atonement, recantation and rebirth. It makes use of no psychiatrists, but is certainly a coercive form of psychotherapy—focusing upon catharsis, analytic interpretations and causative influences from early life. It is a unique form of "treatment," which supplies both the disease and the cure.

UN-CHINESE?

But where did the Chinese learn to be such master psychologists? Is this their process or is it a Russian import? Is it compatible with, or in direct opposition to, traditional Chinese cultural forms? There are no simple answers to any of these questions, but a brief consideration of them is necessary in order to obtain some perspective. By and large, the forms (criticism, "struggle" and confession) as well as most of the content (the allegedly scientific Marxist doctrine) appear to be carried over from Russian Communist practice. But it is the Chinese who have molded these into a comprehensive process, and carried it out on a broad national scale; and it is they who have developed the emphasis upon *reform* rather than *purge*, as well as the nuances of group and individual psychological pressures which make it work.

Despite its borrowings, then, thought reform is essentially a Chinese Communist process. Its history can be traced back to the early days of the Chinese Communist movement (late 1920s or early 1930s) when rather simple reform methods were first applied to captured enemy soldiers. Later, during the Yenan period (1937-

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1945) more sophisticated techniques were developed for intellectuals recruited to the movement, and at the time of the Communist takeover in 1948-49 these had evolved into an extensive thought-reform apparatus. (The process is rather an economical one as the participants reform themselves, and relatively few people are needed to direct a particular reform operation; also, the man who has just been reformed can readily be recruited to work toward reforming others.)

All evidence suggests that the Chinese have evolved their programs on a pragmatic, trial-and-error basis, rather than through the deliberate use of any known psychiatric techniques, or, as is so frequently asserted, of Pavlovian theory.

ONE is struck at first glance with thought reform's bold attack on traditional Chinese cultural forms: the open denunciation of the father in a culture steeped in filial piety, the lack of consideration of "face" in the humiliating public demonstrations, and the violations of codes of loyalty in criticizing family and friends. But it is important to point out that the traditions violated had been under steady assault for more than 50 years, and in this sense the Communists have been riding the wave of the broad intellectual rebellion of modern China.

There are also aspects of the process that are quite consistent with the Confucian tradition, particularly its thesis that man can and should be reeducated, its emphasis upon following the "correct" ideological path as a guide to human conduct, its stress upon "self-cultivation." We see then that it in some ways violates, and in other ways reflects, long-standing Chinese cultural patterns. It also would seem to contain Christian, and possibly Buddhist, influences, indirectly derived. And it no doubt makes use of certain common denominators which exist in all attempts to reach and influence profound human emotions.

But there is one additional factor which I think important in explaining the Chinese Communists' development of this psychologically astute process. Chinese culture has — possibly at the expense of technological advance — always emphasized the *human* aspects of life, and particularly the nuances of personal relationships. Children are taught to be sensitive to psychological currents about them, in order to learn how to behave appropriately toward others. In the educated adult, this sensitivity is expected and required. Most Chinese intellectuals whom I knew, as subjects or as friends, impressed me with their consistent skill in perceiving the emotion at play between one person and another, as well as their tendency to make use of this understanding in seeking their life objectives. They conducted human relationships as one practices a highly-refined art. In this sense, I believe that thought reform could be viewed as the totalitarian expression of a national genius.

Does thought reform succeed in achieving its aims? Is it worth all the trouble which the Chinese Communists expend upon it? These are questions which no one can now answer with certainty. The specific cases at my disposal were only the "failures"—those who fled—but from everything I have been able to learn I would delineate three types of response: the zealous "converts," the most successful products, particularly among the young; the resistors who feel suffocated by the process, some of whom break away; and the great majority of people, the in-between group, partially convinced, but essentially concerned with adapting themselves to this stress and assuring their future under the new regime. Some in the first and third groups feel "purified" and helped by the experience; others, in the second group, have a reverse response, less sympathetic to the regime after their "reform" than they had been before.

On the whole, we can say that thought reform seems to develop in most people intellectual and emotional responses which are useful to the Communist regime. These responses continue to be supported and demanded by the general environment of Communist China long after the particular course has been completed. This, and the great receptivity which many intellectuals felt for the Communist program even before their reform, are crucial factors in the program's effectiveness.

Thought reform has played a large part in superimposing a new Chinese Communist "culture," particularly in the intellectual and ideological spheres. It was most actively applied during the first five years of the Communist regime. Now, as the younger intellectuals emerge with their educations increasingly limited to Communist teachings, there seems to be less emphasis upon "reform" and more focus upon continuing indoctrination. (Most revolutionary colleges, for instance, have been converted into more conventional Marxist schools and training centers.) A modified type of thought reform—"the correction of ideological errors"—is still very much present, receiving periodic waves of emphasis, and will no doubt be a permanent feature of the Chinese Communist regime.

MUCH more time is needed before we can evaluate the extent of "change" which thought reform has brought about in individual Chinese intellectuals. We must await its longer-term interplay with Chinese cultural forces, and we cannot now judge the extent to which the rebelliousness of the modern Chinese intellectual—so effectively made use of—may ultimately work against the process. We do know that psychological forces do not operate in a vacuum. What matters most for Chinese intellectuals, as they pass beyond the stage of initial ideological fervor, is the extent to which they can achieve a workable personal identity and a satisfying way of life under their new and demanding masters.

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FACTORIES AND FARMERS: I

Industrializing in a Hurry—Plans and Problems

In Asia Other Underdeveloped Countries Wait To See Whether China Can Industrialize Rapidly and Still Increase Farm Production

by ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN

THE ADVENT of Communism in China undoubtedly represents a major 20th Century turning point equal in importance to the Russian Revolution. In the Russian case totalitarian planning accelerated the industrialization process started in the late 1800s to such an extent that the Soviet Union is now, at mid-century, a first-rank industrial power. China, starting off in even more backward circumstances and with three times the population, may well attain comparable front-rank industrial stature in a matter of not many more years.

Indeed, one of the essential ingredients of the Communist conquest of mainland China was the deep-seated aspiration to catch up with the West, to narrow the gap, and to industrialize. The Communist triumph climaxed a century of chaos in which military and diplomatic defeats had made the Chinese acutely conscious of the West's technological and industrial superiority. From this point of view, the Chinese Communist program of industrialization has profound historical and nationalist roots—and from its nationalist aspects it derives an appeal not only in China, but in Asia as a whole.

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At the same time, however, the ambition to industrialize at all costs poses this great issue: can the state pursue its ambition without so alienating important population sectors, especially the peasantry, that the whole apparatus of political and economic control may be undermined? If the answer is yes, this has far-reaching implications for the stability of the Chinese Communist regime. It also poses a challenge for other underdeveloped areas embarked upon an industrialization program —a challenge which, paradoxically, can only be met if a different kind of a state assumes in these countries a major development role.

UPON their conquest of the Chinese mainland, the Communists inherited what were essentially three different economies: the economy of traditional China still holding sway over most of the mainland; the more or less modernized, urbanized and commercialized coastal economy of the Treaty Ports; and the comparatively advanced and rapidly industrializing economy of Manchuria.

These three economies had developed more or less separately. Although linked to some extent through trade, there were definite political and institutional barriers between them which hampered economic integration and fusion. The task of breaking down these barriers was left to the Communists, who were determined to harness the resources of each part for the organization of what, in effect, became a new economic entity. This task was,

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of course, greatly facilitated by the termination of civil conflict and the administrative unification of the country.

At the time of the Chinese Communist take-over in 1949, all three segments of the mainland economy were badly disrupted under the impact of prolonged civil war and Soviet dismantling of industrial plant in Manchuria. The most urgent problem facing the new regime was to restore agricultural production and to rehabilitate industrial plant and transport. At the same time, the institutional framework had to be restructured so as to bring the economy under the intimate control of the planning authorities. Once these preparatory tasks were out of the way, the regime apparently felt ready to launch its first Five-Year-Plan.

This Five-Year-Plan, and the entire development program of which it is but the first phase, has been largely patterned on the Soviet model. Thus, the Chinese Communists envisage a development focused on the rapid expansion of producers' goods and defense industries. This is to be accompanied by a more modest rate of growth in the manufacture of textiles needed for barter with the countryside. At the same time, agriculture is to be developed primarily through mobilization of underemployed farm labor for water conservation and other labor-intensive projects.

As a general proposition, one may consider the Chinese Communist program as primarily power-oriented—designed to maximize the rate at which internal control is extended and consolidated, while at the same time augmenting, as rapidly as possible, the external war-making and political potential. In essence, it is a plan that promotes industrial development at the expense of agricultural development. Industrialization is accelerated at the outset; since agriculture is kept on a short investment ration, a larger share of investment resources can be concentrated in industry. But this policy sets up its own vicious circle at a time when the demand for farm products is higher than ever as a result of the need to feed a mounting population, increasingly urbanized, and to meet export goals. Precisely because agricultural development is sluggish, the regime is forced to extract a rising proportion of farm output if this rising demand is to be met. This very process, in turn, further handicaps incentives for agricultural development, so that the screw must be applied even tighter. Under such circumstances, farm output is sacrificed for control and strong compulsions are set in force that drive the system toward collectivization.

On the basis of present indications, the collectivization process in Chinese mainland agriculture will have been basically completed during this year. Thus, it would seem that collectivization in China is proceeding even more rapidly than it did in the Soviet Union, and—on the basis of the available evidence—at a much lower human and material cost. This is a development which could not be foreseen and certainly runs counter to the expectations of most observers.

It would seem, in fact, that a process which required seven years for its consummation in the Soviet Union is being completed in China in two. This rapid pace and its apparent success probably constitutes one of the most important developments in China since the advent of the Communist regime.

IN adopting the Soviet model of economic growth, Mao and his colleagues were nonetheless determined to learn from the Russian experience to do everything in their power to avoid the violence and the negative consequences of Soviet collectivization, reflected in wholesale slaughter of livestock and radical curtailment of farm output between 1928 and 1932. Therefore, the Chinese adopted a policy of what may be termed high-pressure gradualism. This involved a relentless pursuit of the collectivization objective, but based on a series of transitional forms—each successive form involving a greater degree of farm "cooperation"—and using the weapons of persuasion, propaganda, economic pressure and economic incentives. In effect, it entailed the use of carrot-and-stick techniques in judicious combinations.

Unless the situation changes, this may have far-reaching implications for the future course of China's economic development. It could mean that, unlike the Soviets, the Chinese Communists may be able to have their cake and eat it too. That is, they may be in a position to pursue their industrialization objectives and concurrently attain at least modest increases in farm output. In such a case, the Chinese Communists would be in a position to relax their pressure on agriculture and on the consumer sector in general. This in turn could mean that, other things being equal, the Chinese could place greater reliance upon incentives, even in agriculture, than could the Soviets.

However, the focus of Chinese Communist planning is not on agriculture but on heavy industry as is clearly illustrated by the Five-Year Plan targets announced in mid-1955. Thus, the output of steel is to be trebled, power and cement doubled, and machine tools increased by three and a half times; cotton piece goods are to be expanded by less than 50 percent, and grains by less than 20 percent. According to Li Fu-chun, Peking's senior economic planner, the output of means of production

Proportion of Farm Households Collectivized

Year July 1	*Soviet Union* in percent	*Year* end of year	*Mainland China* in percent
1927	0.8	1954	0.0001
1928	1.7	1955	3.9
1929	3.9	1956	83.0
1930	23.6		
1932	61.5		
1937	93.0		

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is to be raised by 126.5 percent and that of consumers' goods by 79.7 percent. In practice, this difference in emphasis is likely to be further accentuated; on the basis of past experience, plans for the heavy industry sector are much more likely to be fulfilled or overfulfilled than for the consumers' goods industries.

Average Annual Rate of Growth in Production of Selected Industrial and Farm Products in China, India and the USSR
(in percent)

Commodity	*First Five Year Plan Period*			*Second Five Year Plan Period*		
	China[a]	India[b]	USSR[c]	China[d]	India[e]	USSR[f]
Coal	13.8	2.6	16.1	12.1	10.3	14.7
Pig Iron	24.1	.....	17.1	.....	.....	18.5
Crude Steel	28.4	3.4[g]	8.2	21.5	27.0[g]	24.6
Crude Oil	30.4	.....	16.5	22.3	.....	5.9
Cement	16.3	12.2[h]	17.1	16.7	15.8[h]	9.4
Electric Power	19.1	8.1	28.2	21.2	14.9	21.8
Paper	16.6	9.6	13.5	18.8	14.2	12.0
Cotton Yarn	3.1	6.3	.....	11.2	4.0	.....
Cotton Cloth	5.0	6.9	.15	8.6	.....	5.1
Sugar	18.1	9.1	-10.4	.....	6.2	23.9
Foodgrains	3.9	3.8	-1.1	6.4	2.9	11.4
Rail Freight Volume	17.7		16.0			16.0

[a] These rates based on first 3 years of the Chinese Five Year Plan running from Jan. 1, 1953 to Dec. 31, 1957.
[b] Based on the full five years of the Plan that ran from April 1, 1951 to March 31, 1956.
[c] Based on rates of growth during the 1928 to 1932 period.
[d] Based on projected rates of growth for 1958 to 1962.
[e] Planned rate of growth for 1956/57 to 1960/61.
[f] Actual rate of growth during 1932 to 1937 period.
[g] Finished steel.
[h] Electric power capacity.

These expectations are confirmed by an analysis of production trends for the period 1949 to 1955. We witness during these years a most rapid rate of expansion in industrial production, most pronounced in heavy industry. The pace of growth appears particularly impressive when placed against the background of the Indian and Soviet experience.

In respect to every category—except cotton textiles—China outdistanced India, at least in terms of rates of growth, and in most cases, in terms of absolute levels as well. (China, of course, has a much larger population, so that per capita comparisons would alter the ratio of the two levels.) The Chinese growth margin is particularly noteworthy in agriculture, which claimed 33 percent of India's public investment resources but only about seven percent of China's (the Chinese figures apply to 1953-55, which included two comparatively poor harvest years, 1953 and 1954). Yet at the same time, the rates of industrial growth in China seem to compare quite favorably with Soviet rates based on the 1928 to 1932 period. Moreover, while Soviet expansion was at the time pretty much confined to the investment-goods sector, with an actual decline in agricultural output and consumers' goods, this does not seem to be the case in Communist China.

Rapidly changing developments can always change these comparative relationships, needless to add, and the new emphasis on industrial development in New Delhi's Second Five-Year Plan may be placing India ahead of China in certain fields. Furthermore, comparisons based on increases in production alone may be grossly misleading. What about changes in the levels of consumption? Unfortunately, the data for assessing the latter are much less satisfactory, particularly for China, so that in this field, systematic comparison is not possible. On the basis of the information that is available, it would seem that in this respect, comparisons may be more favorable to India than to China. In part, this is a matter of deliberate choice and thus reflects two quite different approaches to planning, with the consumer looming much larger in India than in China. As one example of these differing approaches, let me cite railroad utilization. In India, about 40 percent of rail transport volume is devoted to passenger traffic, while in China—with freedom of movement controlled and closely circumscribed—passenger traffic is subordinated to movement of freight and is negligible. This naturally means that while Indian rail transport does better by the consumer, the Chinese by concentrating on freight movement can make their limited transport capacity go further in serving the purposes of increasing production and commercialization.

Here we are led to the central issue: just what are the appropriate criteria for assessing economic progress in different countries? Obviously, from the standpoint of military and war-waging potential, the rate of industrial growth is of prime importance. From an economic welfare point of view, the rate of growth in per capita personal consumption may be the most meaningful criterion. Yet in terms of political appeal, dramatic industrialization programs, accompanied by an aggressive power posture, may seriously rival less easily perceived increases in living standards. Therefore, the outcome of an India-China comparison may yield different results depending upon which of these or other possible performance criteria are applied.

THE differences in the character of the Chinese Communist and Indian development efforts reflect the contrasts between power and welfare-oriented patterns of industrialization. In a sense the Indian program represents a more or less deliberate sacrifice of the speed of industrial expansion for the sake of obtaining rising standards of living in the short run. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists are prepared to defer increases in consumer standards to obtain the maximum speed of

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

Industrial showcase—electronics tube factory opens in Peking, October, 1956

industrial advance. Both countries therefore face a dilemma. In the Indian case, the preoccupation with increases in living standards may turn out to be self-defeating—eating into the rate of saving and investment to the point that economic growth may not keep up with population growth. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, are confronted with the opposite problem: how to keep consumption in check and attain a high rate of forced saving without undermining worker and peasant incentives to the point that the rate of growth is slowed down.

The differences in Indian and Chinese development planning are not confined to ends but relate to means as well. Thus we see almost totally centralized direction of planning and control in China as compared to the much greater scope for individual consumer choice in the Indian plan. But, paradoxically, India's desire for individual choice may possibly be best assured by greater rather than lesser governmental participation in the economy.

In any society, there are a variety of ways in which the state can influence, affect, and direct economic activity. There are certain functions which we normally consider as belonging to the public governmental sphere, such as education, health, welfare, defense, highway construction and operation, maintenance of law and order, guarantee of property and contractual arrangements within which business enterprise can be carried on, and fiscal and monetary management. These are what may be considered as the minimum functions of the state. In addition to these, the state has at its disposal a whole arsenal of direct or indirect levers with which it can influence or affect economic activity. At the other end of the scale one may range government ownership and management of all enterprises combined with comprehensive, total, and highly centralized planning.

Historically, in the underdeveloped countries, however, the state and the social structure on which it was based were the very agencies hampering, retarding and preventing economic development. In effect, the same conditions that create the need for massive state intervention in one form or another also tend to breed a type of state which is singularly unequipped to intervene effectively on behalf of economic development. Thus, in China, the state assumed very few responsibilities in the economy beyond assuring that it would provide a stable, continuing, and adequate source of revenue for the imperial household and the gentry-bureaucracy.

The continuing failure of the traditional Chinese state to respond to the challenge of modernization, the institutional rigidities permeating the traditional social structure, the incapacity and unwillingness of the ruling classes to come to terms with change, their inability to understand the character of the innovating influences and to follow a policy of enlightened self-interest, all served to retard the process of industrialization for so long that the explosive cumulative tensions could no longer be contained. The Chinese economy erupted violently into an industrial revolution under totalitarian control in the face of the repeated failure of the old state to perform its minimum functions.

Conceivably, many underdeveloped countries engaged in the struggle for economic improvement may be forced, pushed or compelled to resort to similar maximum solutions precisely because the state has failed in the past or is failing now to perform the minimum functions on a massive and adequate scale. Indeed, one might argue that a massive application of state power in the minimum spheres is one of the preconditions for averting total government operation of an underdeveloped economy in many countries such as India. What is needed is more, and more effective, rather than less, government economic activity today to avert slipping into a whole-hog totalitarian economic pattern tomorrow.

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FACTORIES AND FARMERS: 2

Taking Away The "Good Earth"

"The Myth of Agrarian Reform Is Now Exploded"—To Feed a Growing Population, Peking Collectivizes the Peasantry

by ROBERT GUILLAIN

A MAJOR change is now taking place in one aspect of the perpetually shifting Chinese revolution. Little is heard of this in Europe, and perhaps even less in America. The Communist regime is busily engaged in taking away from the Chinese peasant the "Good Earth" which it had given to him. The change is now virtually accomplished, and the collective system has already almost replaced the private ownership concept which was an article of faith in early revolutionary planning. One of the fundamentals in which the Chinese revolutionaries differed from the Russians was the right of the peasant to own property. But today, 500 million Chinese are involved in the government's gigantic plan for the substitution of individual exploitation of land by a *kholkoz* type of collectivism.

I was in Peking in October, 1955, when President Mao (he is never called Mao Tse-tung in China) announced his collectivization plan in a report to the party, intimating that the first stage of land socialization was to be completed within six months, and attacking with an unaccustomed violence those who might be inclined to resist or slow down his design.

For 20 years a correspondent in the Far East, ROBERT GUILLAIN *of the Paris newspaper* Le Monde *lived in China for part of the Thirties, returned to Shanghai for six months immediately before and after the Communist takeover, and revisited the new regime for two months in 1955. His book* 600 Millions de Chinois *is scheduled for US publication this year.*

This news was sensational for a variety of reasons. In the first place, until then the official attitude to collectivization had been one of caution, and such collectivization as had taken place was of an experimental nature only. Secondly, prior to this announcement nothing had been heard from Mao for several months, and rumors were current that he was slowly being eased out of power by younger men such as Liu Shao-chi. Moreover, the report delivered in October had been completed during the previous July, and had been kept a close secret for three months. True, the party hierarchy knew about it, and many Communist leaders had been deeply disturbed by it, but foreign diplomats—British, French, Swiss and others—had no knowledge whatever of this extraordinarily well-kept secret, a good example of the wall of secrecy which surrounds foreigners in China. Another surprising aspect of the report was that Mao implied that he had gone over the heads of the Central Committee; he had modified the policy advanced by that body in the spring of 1955, and only sought its approbation three months after the new plan was completed, and when it was too late to call a halt.

Two facts provide the key to the situation. In the first place, voluntary adherence by the peasants to the agricultural production cooperatives which preceded collectivization—the "pre-*kholkozes*" of China—existed more in fancy than in fact. No sooner had Mao made his declaration, however, than the regime unleashed a violent campaign of propaganda and persuasion (a word which seems to have a special meaning in China). Collective

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pressure on individuals was intensified, and within eight days of the publication of Mao's program, I was able to report that thousands, even millions of peasants, had "spontaneously" given their support to the cooperatives. Socialization of the land had become the official theme, and throughout the two months of my stay in China the word "cooperative" literally drowned out every other noise. It became impossible to talk to a Chinese without coming almost immediately to the universal refrain of agrarian socialization. Mao indicated in his report, not perhaps without some degree of naïveté, that he knew in advance how many persons, for years to come, would "volunteer" to join cooperatives; he gave the number of peasants who would "spontaneously" give up their private property between 1956 and 1958 and the total number who would do so before 1960.

The second fact which was clear to me during my stay in Peking was that the Communist Party itself had been deeply divided on the question of land socialization before Mao made his policy declaration. The actual process of collectivization by stages had been initiated earlier with experiments conducted mainly in the northeast (Manchuria) and the north. The stages were: the organization of peasants into temporary mutual assistance teams; the permanent establishment of teams; transformation to socialist-type cooperatives; the setting up of fully socialized cooperatives similar to the Russian *kholkozes*. From the outset the process had failed to develop as planned, and in spite of some early expansion, the movement was slowed down in 1953. An acceleration was noted in 1954, but the general pace was still claimed to be slow. On the contrary, however, a brutal forced increase was under way, and instead of the 45,000 cooperatives planned for the end of 1954, the government was able to announce 450,000 by that date. In February, 1955, 600,000 cooperatives were in being.

This overly rapid development caused some uneasiness and resistance even in the highest Communist Party circles, and a great deal of Mao's report was aimed at eliminating the malaise. He did not denounce the peasant; he did not even speak of him directly, but concentrated his displeasure on those in positions of responsibility who opined that the movement was going too fast, and who were deliberately applying the brakes. These he accused of furthering a policy of "wait and see"; they were, he said, rightist deviationists who had dared to challenge the policy of the Central Committee. In the face of this "timorous and pernicious rightism," he was, he declared, turning sharply to the Left, toward the great adventure of collectivization.

THE motives which impelled the Chinese Government to launch half a billion peasants on the "high tide of socialism" are obvious enough, though they are not apparent in official declarations. Collectivization of the land is the new regime's attempt to find an answer to the problem which has long haunted the planners in Peking —the problem of population. The population of China, increasing by two percent per annum, is growing by 12 million yearly; in 1980 there will be one billion Chinese, and, if the present rate of increase is maintained, the population will have reached 1.5 billion by the year 2002. By collectivizing the land, Peking hopes to keep production at a level which will more than counterbalance the snowballing number of births.

A second reason for the plan is also economic and is also soft-pedaled in public utterances. China, like Russia, is intent on building up her heavy industry, but the problem is how to finance such a plan in a poor and hitherto completely agricultural country. The only possible means lies through the land. By draining off all excess production and monopolizing agricultural commerce and its profits, confiscating benefits which might accrue to the peasants under a *stakhanovite* incentive system, and rationing food in town and countryside even more than at present, exportable agricultural surpluses may be created.

THE CONSERVATIVE PEASANT

THERE are also compelling political motives for collectivization, and as to these, the regime and Mao himself are much more frank. In Mao's report great stress is laid on the "recent spontaneous and growing tendency of the cultivators to move in the direction of capitalism." It is just this genuinely spontaneous tendency that must be obliterated. Teng Tsu-hui, a deputy prime minister and the party's agricultural director, admits in the first annual report on the Five-Year Plan that while all eyes were on industrialization, a serious threat was developing in rural areas, and that the revolution was stumbling on the block of peasant conservatism. Since the first agrarian re-distribution had created millions of small proprietors, a struggle between socialist development and nascent capitalism had been sharpening. This situation, said Teng Tsu-hui, called for urgent measures.

From this it becomes obvious that collectivization runs directly counter to peasant values—and that if the peasant is voluntarily for anything at all, he is voluntarily for capitalism. Collectivization can only flourish in rural China if peasant conservatism can be overcome, and the latter is so deep-rooted that Teng Tsu-hui was forced to ask: "Which will be the victor?"

I have visited several agricultural cooperatives, mainly in Hopei, an established agricultural region; Manchuria, the pilot province, and Kansu, the Far West of the new China. All were quite evidently models, the only ones open to visitors. The peasants I interviewed, chosen by my guides and speaking through an official interpreter in the presence of witnesses, eulogized the system in terms learned faithfully by rote. In spite of such declarations it was clear from visits to the villages that a virtually irresistible pressure was necessarily being exerted

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on non-conformists. The cooperatives, backed by the party organization of the village, and having at their disposal specialist advisers, promoters of study groups for criticism and self-criticism, a formidable propaganda machine, and the power to interfere even in private life, were making an independent existence impossible.

Yet the most effective means of pressure is economic and only indirectly political. Unorganized peasants cannot hope to compete with cooperatives having the backing of state and party: it is the cooperatives that receive the new plows, scarce fertilizers, new seeds, and cash loans from the nearest credit cooperative. The essential purpose of this is to convince the non-conformists that production can be increased under collectivization. Furthermore, the Chinese peasant is completely at the mercy of the state, since the latter, by a stroke of the pen, assumed responsibility in 1954 for the marketing of all agricultural produce. In 1954 nothing could be bought or sold in the countryside except through the appropriate government organization. The state determines what each farmer shall plant, fixes land taxes in advance, and decides, often in a quite arbitrary manner, what purchases to make in each village after the harvest. Sooner or later the individualist peasant, having lost all liberty, will have no alternative but to take the "road to socialism."

Along this road the cooperatives which were shown to me in 1955 were half-way houses, in the sense that, although the peasants had pooled their land, they were still in theory proprietors. This meant that they were paid on the separate bases of the amount of land contributed to the pool and the amount of work furnished by the individual. Now this is being gradually changed by the simple process of reducing to zero the remuneration which comes from land contribution and increasing payment for services rendered in labor. With the completion of this process the *kholkoz* system will be an established fact.

THE PEASANTS RESIST

THE Communist press was estimating in 1955 that collectivization would take from 5 to 10 years. In the autumn of that year I was told that about five years would be needed. In actual fact, the entire process was accomplished in a year.

Before the peasants were forced *en masse* into the cooperatives, the regime promised to pay them a sort of ground rent, for a period of five or perhaps ten years. Yet the moment they were registered as cooperative members their property rights were withdrawn and they were paid only for the amount of work they contributed —that is to say, they were placed on a salaried basis. By the end of 1956, more than 80 percent of China's peasantry had been forced to conform and today, in the spring of 1957, the confiscation of all private landed property is about complete.

Speaking in May, 1956, Teng Tsu-hui announced to the plaudits of the party that, for the first time since the revolution, it could truly be said that the Communist Party "held the country."

In the West it has long been customary to characterize the Chinese revolution as an agrarian reform movement, moderate and almost conservative in some of its attitudes. This legend is now exploded. The Chinese peasant is now beginning to realize what it is he had to deal with; he knows that he is facing a revolution much more powerful than any of the calamities which have descended upon the "Good Earth" in the last 4,000 years. His reaction is, as it always has been, in such circumstances, to begin to bow before the storm. I say advisedly, *begin* to bow, since the great adventure of collectivization is not terminated—in fact, it has only just begun.

BEFORE Mao's declaration of October, 1955, the peasants manifested their true feelings with considerable frankness. In 1954 and 1955, peasant resistance to the regime's plans had been direct and effective, because it was known that this resistance was tolerated in certain government circles, which were themselves uneasy at the prospects inherent in the operation which was being put under way. Peasant resistance had been exacerbated by disastrous harvests in 1953 and 1954. Liao Liu-yen, the Chinese Minister of Agriculture, admitted at the beginning of 1955 that there had been a serious famine in certain areas in 1954. Government grain collectors attempting to seize crops had met with resistance. Liao recognized the existence of opposition to a planned economy, and conceded that there was considerable tension in the countryside. The spontaneous feeling of the peasant for capitalism, recognized later by Mao, was manifesting itself quite clearly in spite of the denunciations of official directives and government propaganda. Responsible Communist groups received orders from Peking that there was to be no truce in the class struggle in villages and cooperatives. Local party agents, meanwhile, permitted all sorts of errors and abuses in carrying out their duties, and the peasant retaliated by failing to prepare for forthcoming harvests; in some areas they even cut down trees and killed the cattle. These were recognized as the classic signs of peasant despair, and in the report mentioned above, Liao spoke of excessive haste, inexperience, and shoddily performed duties.

Shortly afterward came the epoch-making speech by Mao, which launched the policy of mass collectivization and recruitment into cooperatives. The peasants quickly knew that the situation had changed. They could no longer count on support or toleration in certain government circles. The peasant was not in any way convinced of the reality of the benefits which would accrue under the new socialist system. Yet when it became clear that superior authority was unanimously determined that the peasant should volunteer to become a cooperative farmer,

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the peasant knew that there was no other course to follow, realizing himself to be helpless against a regime possessed of such powerful means of "persuasion." His Asian wisdom told him to *wish to do what the government wished him to do*—for the moment. But he knew that later on, slowly, indirectly and from within, he would again have the chance to oppose the government with his inertia, his passive resistance, and those tricks of secret sabotage which have for so long been the despair of Chinese regimes.

He has not had to wait long. Only one year after the Mao report the government found itself faced with the consequences of its over-hasty actions. The cooperatives were in a critical condition in the fall of 1956, and peasant discontent was rife throughout the entire country. I am in possession of extensive and recent documentation, entirely from Communist sources (official reports and directives, speeches by Communist leaders, official press editorials), which testify to the troubled situation.

At the beginning of the fall of 1956, a gloomy balance sheet was published by the *People's Daily* of Peking, which stated on September 7 that results had fallen short of planning, and that promises could not be kept. Plans, said the *Daily*, had not been realistic. Local Communist directors, instead of easing the pace, forced the peasants to work too hard, and multiplied their demands upon the government for financial advances, machines and fertilizers. In short, they were trying to work a dead horse as if it were still alive. A directive of the Central Committee published on September 12, 1956, enumerates the errors of the local leaders: excessive haste, arbitrary and unnecessary technical innovations (the result of ignorance), and insistence upon excessive work, particularly in the case of women. A government publication of November 25 confirmed the existence of widespread unrest and announced the punishment of certain elements who had defied both law and discipline.

On December 1, 1956, the *People's Daily* was even more pessimistic. Noting that the harvest was over, the paper declared that the situation was not bad from the economic point of view, and that state control had resulted in an increased productivity. But, it added that from the political and psychological point of view the situation was deplorable. A great gulf has been created between party appointees and the peasants. Indeed, the whole scheme has fallen down on one fundamental issue: the earnings of the peasants have not increased, they have indeed been lowered. The *Daily* alludes to a promise made to the peasants at the beginning of 1956, probably with the intention of softening the ruthless confiscation of their property rights, to the effect that nine out of every ten peasants would earn more in 1956, as salaried members of cooperatives, than they had previously done as small proprietors. The promise, of course,

'Join Collectives:' cover of *Wang Hsiu Luan*, pictorial story of peasant heroine's exploits—"fifth in a series of proletarian pictures"

was not kept, and Communist officials are now behind shuttered doors trying to find a plausible explanation. The peasants, says the *Daily*, are demanding explanations and these must be given them. Frank discussions must be undertaken with the masses, and the Communist leaders must practice self-criticism. Furthermore, concludes the official journal, the masses must learn to understand and to give support to their organizers.

It will prove very difficult to obtain this support, for the organizers have sadly ill-treated the peasants. This is also pointed out in the press. The Chinese press, since "de-Stalinization" in Russia and the announcement at Peking of the "doctrine of the Hundred Flowers," has given considerable, albeit censored, space to the discontent and disappointment of the people. The following extracts from the *People's Daily* need no explanation:

"Now that the great majority of the peasants have joined cooperatives, local party organizers can terrorize them through both political and economic means." (June 27, 1956). *"They say: 'Now that the cooperatives own the land, we have the peasants' throat and they dance to our tune'."*

"Many local organizers are acting illegally," said the *Kwangming Daily* on July 8, 1956, *"they are searching houses, arresting and torturing people, forcing couples into marriage and stealing collective property."* And, adds the *Kwangming Daily*, if the full truth were to be told it would be found that the local organizers are being aided and abetted by their superiors.

Toward the end of November the *People's Daily* revealed a wider employment of coercion and other forcible means by the authorities, often, it added, *"directly stimulated by the plans and arbitrary decisions made by the higher authorities."* A great many of these abuses are now being aired in the Chinese press. Local organizers are revealed as calling "accusation meetings" as a means of stifling any discontent. The new rural bureaucracy is proliferating. In one cooperative in Shansi there are 300 officials for a little more

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than 400 homes; at another in the same area there are 100 officials for 200 families. Peasants are forced to attend meetings which last far into the night, and then have to rise, still tired, for work next morning at 5 o'clock. Cases of abortion are increasing among peasant mothers. Reports furnished by local leaders to their superiors are often false. The accounts of the cooperatives are badly kept, accountancy being too complicated a matter for peasants who are only semi-literate. Most serious of all in the eyes of the workers, there exist widespread injustices and errors in calculating pay.

In order to appease the growing discontent and particularly to make some compensation for the stagnation of peasant revenue in cooperatives, the Peking Government made the surprising decision in the fall of 1956 to permit the reorganization of "free markets" for agricultural food products and the products of cottage industry. This is contrary to socialist precepts, which makes the decision all the more remarkable. The reaction of the peasants to this official gesture has been most significant: huge numbers of them have rushed to avail themselves of the opportunity to make a small profit, as they did in the days of capitalism; many thousands have deserted the cooperatives. They have left harvests in the fields, and gone off to become traveling peddlers; they have left the cooperatives in order to set up as small merchants, or have even drifted off to live in the cities and make do as best they can. In short, anything is preferable to returning to the village. The effects of speculation were soon apparent in the rise in prices in the "free markets," and severe government restrictions have now intervened to limit this new-found freedom.

The peasant state of mind in the early winter of 1956 was conclusively revealed in the sabotage of the preparations for the spring crops of 1957. The *People's Daily* complained that the cooperatives were not carrying out their winter tasks; winter sowing was being held up and maintenance work was being neglected. This was claimed to be the case in Shantung, where the peasants were discouraged; the accounts had not been compiled and the workers still did not know how much they were to be paid for their work during the past year. The organizers did not dare to push the peasants, and both workers and their superiors, said the *Daily,* made no pretense at the enthusiasm which was shown when recruitment was initiated the previous winter.

It seems to me open to great doubt whether the Chinese authorities will be able to carry out their collectivization projects without alienating the mass of the Chinese people. I do not yet feel sure, however, that this question, from the Communist point of view at least, seems as pressing as it does to outside observers. For the Communists, the real question is whether the regime is strong enough to continue its collectivization plans *in spite of* peasant resistance, and whether it is thus capable —even though alienating the peasantry—of achieving the desired economic results. Mao Tse-tung and his ministers feel they can afford to proceed, since they know their regime is so strongly organized and its grip so complete that Communist experiments can be continued indefinitely. They are convinced, it seems to me, that they can demonstrate to the recalcitrant peasant (an uprooted peasant is always recalcitrant) that the *kholkoz* system can wring a greater production from the soil and can reward its workers more highly. It must surely be annoying to Mao not to have been able to make this demonstration during the first year the system was fully in operation, since the first year is one of prime propaganda import. On the other hand, it is, after all, only the first year—and the experiment will continue.

In my opinion, it is too early to hazard a definite guess concerning the ultimate success of collectivization. In spite of difficulties, abuses, reverses and peasant resistance, the enormous machinery of collective farming will not slow down. Its rhythm will be maintained by hundreds of thousands of Communist organizers, directing half a billion peasants in a million villages and hamlets. The men of Peking have already shown that when the road they are following does not appear to lead to the desired destination, they know how to shift their course, their Chinese common sense preventing them from losing their way. They have not wavered up to the present; their revolutionary spirit is, they feel, strong enough to face all contingencies.

The stakes in this venture are immense; the regime may even be playing with its future. After all, we are constantly told, the revolution owed its first success to peasant gratitude for Mao's gift of the "Good Earth." What will be left to Mao if, not only having lost the goodwill of the peasants, he also fails to achieve his economic objectives—failing even to bring contentment to the peasants "in spite of themselves"?

The political audacity of Mao becomes all the more astonishing when it is considered that China launched this collectivist enterprise at a time when Soviet Russia was publicizing its reservations as to the value of collectivization. Or perhaps "audacity" does not fit a case which exemplifies, rather, submission to the determinism of Communist doctrine.

Whatever may be the case, it seems certain that Communist China is not contemplating any external political adventures. She needs to pause. A pause is necessary for the realization of the industrialization plan alone, and that is only half of the picture. Superimposed on the industrial revolution is the agricultural revolution, and the entire manpower of China is mobilized behind these critical internal programs. Thus China will need peace on her frontiers for several years to come.

Translated from the French.

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

Rev. William Kelly, one of four US clerics still in China

by PETER SCHMID

TO THE observer who does not scratch too deeply beneath the surface even Christianity seems to be in order in Communist China. The Reverend Chao Fu-san, Vice-Director of the Yenching Theological Seminary, was unstinted in his praise. I had met the young Anglican at a Christmas celebration in the Peking Methodist Church, where the Red Flag hung strangely in the candle light of the Christmas tree. This same strange symbiosis greeted me in the theological seminary maintained in common by all the Protestant churches in North China. The lithograph of Christ, the Son of God, hung fraternally beside Mao Tse-tung, the son of man, and I discoursed for more than an hour with Chao and Director F. F. Li under the reproduction of Picasso's peace dove, which shared in representing the Holy Spirit.

"When the Communist armies drew near," both declared, "all of us Christians prepared ourselves for martyrdom. We were ready to suffer persecution and death for the sake of our faith, to see our churches closed and our congregations dispersed. But just the opposite happened. I might say that the churches are better off than before. First, they have been cleansed of all those elements customarily described as 'rice Christians', that is, those opportunists who hoped for some small position or other advantage from their adherence to the Christian faith. Second, the improvement in the economic situation of the common people has helped religion. Formerly, anxiety for their daily bread was so overpowering that the people neglected spiritual needs for the sake of their stomachs. Now, we find, they have much more time to listen to our message. The peasants in the country, who for decades could not save a penny for urgent repairs to our church, have now raised this money . . . ."

"And what is the price?" I asked abruptly, "the price which the government demands of you?"

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Both looked at me with an embarrassed smile. "No price at all," Chao rejoiced. "We are completely free to live our faith and our calling. We are allowed to preach the Christian message unhindered. We are even allowed to take a stand against materialism—it being understood, of course, that in so doing we do not concretely attack the State. But this rival position *vis-à-vis* the materialistic State, I must add, has done our church good. Today we can no longer content ourselves with an indolent devotion; we must, if we wish to win over the youth, impart to the Christian message just as strong an attraction."

"And can you do that?" I asked. "Is it not just that that the Communists are counting on, that the youth will, as a matter of course, succumb to the attraction of Marxism, and the churches, powerless, be left empty?"

"No," cried Chao, "you can believe me, that is not so. Candidates for the ministry throng to our seminary as never before. Just come to our Sunday school: we have a whole crowd of Communist pioneers in it. Infiltration is not unilateral; we also penetrate into their ranks."

It was a pleasure to hold discourse with Chao. He was, I believe, the most brilliant brain that I met during my trip. Well and good—skeptical as I was whether faith necessarily increases with social progress (indeed, it is usually the contrary), I had to admit some rhyme and reason in his other arguments. Could it be that China had the way "to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things which are God's"—to trade acceptance of the regime as loyal Chinese citizens in a genuine exchange for religious freedom?

"But why then the numerous arrests of pastors and priests?" I replied almost despairingly. Chao answered without hesitation. "They have all transgressed against the laws, either as enemies of the State or through common immorality. You know that the Papal Nuncio two years ago conspired with reactionary circles to blow up our President Mao on the occasion of a public ceremony."

I looked speechless at the highly intelligent face of my interlocutor. "And you believe that?" I stammered. "That is quite simply an absurd fabrication. . . . "

Chao shook with laughter. "It is absurd, incredible. But I have seen proofs at an exhibition, the confessions, the bombs, everything."

"And do you not realize that this is all fraud and forgery, like the whole Korean bacterial warfare?"

AGAIN I was interrupted by loud laughter on the part of both clergymen. This time Dr. Li answered me. "As to that affair, I myself have seen the plane that dropped the bacteria," he giggled. "I was invited into the region near the border. A plane flew high over us, scarcely visible. Afterwards, the search parties went out and came back with infected ants, with scraps of paper full of noxious mushrooms. No, it is all true, what our government says, all true. . . . "

As we stepped out, I saw a blackboard in the courtyard with a drawing of a Soviet giant advancing victoriously and an Uncle Sam hobbling miserably along—showing, in percentage terms, recent industrial development in the Soviet Union and the capitalist world. Just behind, in a lecture hall, a Baptist professor was expounding Christian dogma. Sorrow was portrayed in the face of Christ; beside it, Mao wore a slight smirk.

The velvet glove, not the club, serves the subtle surgery of the Chinese Communists. Why destroy something which one can use for his own purposes? Why strike down the churches—making them stronger through martyrdom—when their organizations can be built into mighty agencies for the spiritual transformation of a whole people through indoctrination and brainwashing? For a bishop under the cross to confirm the lie of germ warfare works greater wonders than a thousand speeches by rubber-stamp agents. Even if the Reverend Chao were right—even if infiltration operates both ways—the Christian message must in time lose its essence when it is paired with lies. Infiltration by the stronger and more consistent ultimately wins out, and there can be no doubt who that is in China.

"MERELY NEUTRALITY"

WHOEVER allows himself to be politically synchronized, it was clear to me, can live his faith in peace. Even in the Catholic Church of St. Joseph, in which I attended a Mass, there was nothing in outward appearances to reveal that the priests had broken with the Pope at Rome and had embraced the "Chinese Catholic Church" under the auspices of a "Committee for Religious Reform." The sacrament was administered exactly as if they had still remained true. The church was full of the faithful scarcely aware of the difference—among them dozens of small children who crept contentedly, between those kneeling, on travels of discovery.

Peter Ma, whom I later sought in the vestry, left me with a less certain impression than Chao. He, too, assured me that he enjoyed complete freedom of doctrine (though he obviously had to submit his sermons for prior censorship). But he then added quickly, as if out of bad conscience, that as a good Chinese he naturally had to contribute to the defense against American imperialism. When I questioned him about the imprisoned priests, he would say nothing. I received the impression that he was confused and distressed, a man spiritually baffled. For it is much harder for a Catholic to make his peace with the regime. As guardian of the faith, as representative of God's kingdom, the Church must stand up and face the Communist usurpation and it does so. It is much easier for Protestants to speak with their God in the quiet of a small room, purely as an individual, and to serve the State loyally in other respects. A physician

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

At Yenching Seminary, once the pride of US Protestan tism in China, Director Rev. G. F. Li (right) and Vice-Director Rev. Chao Fu-san stand beneath Picasso's Peace Dove

whose genuine piety could not be doubted told me that he was indeed teased at times by his Communist colleagues about his faith, but that professionally he had not been injured in any way on that account. The regime reacts with hostility only when it feels a determined, combative resistance. In many cases it does not even demand support, merely neutrality.

In Shanghai, for example, the most resolute and most prominent priests were arrested in 1953. But divine service continues in their churches under less exposed priests. They still celebrate Mass and preach as before, with none of the government propaganda heard from many Protestant pulpits.

"We do not know whether they have signed a declaration of loyalty," a faithful Catholic woman complained to me, "whether they are still genuine priests or not. Brainwashing is done very discreetly; no one notices anything. We have only one criterion whereby we perceive the truth. The true church is poor as a beggar today; a few pitiful flowers are on the altar and the lights are turned out, as soon as the first ray of daylight penetrates at early Mass, in order to economize electricity. It is only indirectly that we learn of our priests' betrayal: when mountains of flowers appear on the altar and the church is radiant with lights. For the devil makes it his business to shower his own with inexhaustible gifts, to renovate the houses of God and to point them out to the world—splendidly varnished empty shells."

When it is possible for a Chinese Christian, with or without mental reservations, to live in peace (or at least on good terms) with his government, then foreign missions and missionaries can hope for no grace from the Communists. Were not the missionaries as much as any foreign capitalists relics of that period of humiliation when the Chinese were condemned to lick the boots of foreigners? Why should white men—Europeans and Americans—teach the Chinese their God and their morals? Was not that a humiliating presumption? And had they not in countless cases proved to be merely the forerunners of capitalists and soldiers and thus the allies of the imperialists? If Red China today imprisons and tortures missionaries, is that not, like so much else, a balancing of accounts—the items having accumulated over the centuries and the outstanding debts now being abruptly liquidated?

Today there is only a vanishing number of foreign ecclesiastics in China, and they are suffered only because they stand to a certain degree in the protective shadow of foreign diplomats. That is the case in more than a metaphorical sense, for example, with the Union Church in Peking, which is located in the immediate vicinity of the Swiss and Scandinavian Legations. I shall not quickly forget the visit that I made to an 83-year-old American pastor, Reverend William Kelly, who came to China more than 40 years ago as a medical missionary and married a Chinese woman. His church had been able to save

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itself from the overwhelming pressure of taxes by giving the government a large part of the piece of land on which it stood in exchange for tax exemption, and now it is blessed by the presence nearby of a large laundry. Though its walls have remained physically standing, it is nevertheless, in a deeper sense, extinguished. The door remains closed all day, and if anyone rings, it is a long time before Reverend Kelly's son shows up—carefully replacing the chain with its padlock after letting you in. The old man lives there in a kind of kitchen, hermetically sealed off from any work. The University students, who had so valued his love and counsel in the past, no longer dare to go to his divine services, because everyone who crosses his closely-watched threshold had to deliver in advance to the police particulars concerning himself—and who could afford to do so?

STRANGE PROTECTORS

And so the meager dozen worshipers I observed had crept out of the all-too-large church into a simple meeting room. They were mostly foreigners belonging to the diplomatic corps or Europeans married to Chinese women. As I came into the catacomb-like stillness, all looked at me inquiringly: Who is this stranger? Reverend Kelly did not conduct the services but rather an elderly lady who is among that number happy with their spiritual poverty. I was disappointed: it seemed to me that those here at such risk deserved more nourishing spiritual food. I learned later, on meeting this woman, that her husband had been denied work by the government and that her daughter, who was a teacher, had also been prevented from practicing her profession. "We suffer for the Lord," smiled the old lady. As I walked out from there in the darkness, I felt someone suddenly seize hold of my arm. Still another lady, the one who had played the harmonium, whispered, "She did not tell you the whole truth. Her husband was a high official and expert in a ministry. They offered to allow him to keep his post, but he refused to work for the Communists. Her daughter also had a good position as teacher of biology; she was dismissed because she refused to introduce her pupils to Darwinism. Don't trust them, these martyrs who have a mania for suffering. Their fanaticism is a danger, not merely to them, but also to us."

At the only remaining convent for foreign women in Peking, the Mother Superior looked out with cunning, unsentimental eyes from beneath her hood and answered not a word to my questions. She had told me right from the beginning that prudence required her silence, and so she met my curiosity with inexorable smiles. She would not even tell me whether she would prefer another post. To the nun every post in which God places her must be held equally dear no matter how difficult or easy. Yet every foreigner in Peking knew that here, where lips must be sealed shut, was one of the most difficult of all callings. Indeed, though a Christ in stone holds his hands in blessing over the heads of the children who gather here each morning for instruction, even this can be, thanks only to the paradoxical protection of Allah and the Hindu trinity—Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva—rather than to His own power.

Hostile officials in the Ministry of the Interior had attempted to eject the 17 remaining French nuns. It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Chou En-lai himself—that held a protecting hand over them, for the simple reason that such good friends as the Indian and Indonesian ambassadors did not wish to be without the Catholic school—the only one in China in which their children would not be stuffed with Communist propaganda. And so, every morning a regular United Nations climbs out of diplomatic Cadillacs which stop under Christ extending his blessing. All shapes and colors of faces: white, yellow, chocolate brown; Burmese slant-eyes, Hindu unfathomables, blond, black, I know not what else. The children played in the courtyard, supervised by gentle Westerners who did not question where their service called them. Even these Franciscan nuns had become a carefully isolated island, no less than their Protestant colleague, Kelly; no Chinese child was permitted to mingle his voice in the rejoicing of the others; none enjoyed even on schoolroom benches the purely professional instruction of these white Christian women. "Only for diplomats," one could have written on the convent door as well as on their church—the only one in which foreigners could go to mass with the certainty that they would still be received by a priest loyal to Rome.

Translated from the German.

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"A TREMENDOUS FORCE"

The Chinese Red Army

Mao's 2.5 Million Men Under Arms, Supplied By Soviet Arsenals, Play a Key Role in the Regime

by RICHARD L. WALKER

AUGUST 1, 1957, will mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Chinese Red Army, and already preparations are under way in Peking for celebrating the occasion. Chinese Communist armed forces, now called the People's Liberation Army, have become one of the great military establishments of the world. These modern technically equipped armies of 1957 bear little resemblance to the hodge-podge gathering of only 10,000 which formed the first nucleus of a Red Army in China. The intervening years have been full of color, and some remarkable feats, such as the much-romanticized Long March, have helped to lend a mystique of invincibility to this revolutionary force. Its zeal has led many of its chroniclers to accept the concept of "inevitable victory" which is part of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine which inspires it.

One aspect of the Red Army has undergone remarkably little change in these three decades—its leadership. This is a tightly-knit group of professional soldiers and revolutionaries who, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, have been unwaveringly appreciative of the role of armed might in Chinese politics. They have carried on constant warfare against many enemies—the Nationalists, the warlords, the Japanese, the Nationalists again, the United Nations, the Tibetans. They continue a campaign against all resistance inside China today and a position of armed alertness without stable peace in Korea, the Taiwan area, Viet-Nam, Burma, Assam and Tibet. It is worth pointing out, incidentally, that throughout these long years of revolutionary war, as today, the leaders of the Chinese Red Army have never strayed from their claim that they represented the cause of peace and that those who resisted their armed might were the warmongers.

This points up a fact which must be kept constantly in mind in any consideration of the Chinese scene today: the top leaders in the government are still predominantly military men. They plan their civilian administration in terms of battles and campaigns in which the slightest deviation from orders is tantamount to treason. Their language is the language of class warfare and struggle. The order and discipline, conformity and regimentation which most foreign observers note in China today bears a close relationship to the thought patterns and experience of the leaders. Vice-Minister of Defense T'an Cheng told a youth congress in September, 1955, that one of the purposes of the organization of workers, farmers, government employees and students in China today is to train them in the discipline which will be demanded later on in the military services.

Mao Tse-tung himself is predominantly a military man. He is one of the most brilliant strategists of modern times and has made significant theoretical contributions to the concepts of guerrilla warfare and its role in economically underdeveloped areas. He has stated for the record his firm belief that "the central task and the highest form of revolution is to seize political power by force, to solve problems by war." His major victories came through the mobilization of military control over the peasant areas of China.

Author of China Under Communism: The First Five Years, RICHARD L. WALKER *is Assistant Professor of History at Yale University. His book was the result of extended field research in Taiwan.*

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Around Mao are clustered a group of friends and comrades most of whom share his military experience and who share today the rule of China. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this point is to examine a few facts about the makeup of the new Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party created at the Eighth Party Congress in September, 1956. All but four of the 17 members have had experience in military leadership, three as political commissars and 10 in direct command. Seven of the 10 are among the 10 top leaders of Communist armies since 1937 who were given the rank of Marshal of the People's Republic of China on September 23, 1955. Interestingly enough, two former members of the Politburo who were shifted to the position of alternate members at the Eighth Congress are men without this predominantly military background, two new members are militarists.

This then is a basic background fact which dare not be ignored in any assessment of the regime in China today. The Politburo, the supreme power in the conduct of affairs on the mainland and in foreign policy, is composed of first-generation revolutionists, dedicated, cohesive and firmly convinced that political success cannot be separated from armed might. When they claimed last fall that leadership of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao has been truly "collective leadership," it was no idle boast. Mao, Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chu Teh, Teng Hsiao-ping and Chen Yun, the members of the standing committee of the Politburo, have together with their top-brass colleagues exhibited remarkable staying power, perseverance, unanimity and *esprit de corps*.

ARMY IN TRANSITION

THEY have been quick to realize that a unified China, seeking to establish its position as a world power, demands an entirely different type of military power than the exclusively land armies made up of comrades, guerrillas, and former Nationalist and warlord troops which enabled them to seize power. The realists in Peking have set as their goal a "modernized revolutionary army," and they will have gone a long way toward achieving that goal by the time the thirtieth anniversary of the PLA rolls around.

After the founding of the regime on October 1, 1949, the navy and air force were integrated as regular services in Communist China's armed forces. The next task was the standardization of equipment and organization of the PLA. Much of this was accomplished during the Korean War when a strange mixture of captured Japanese, United States, British and German weapons were gradually replaced by modern Soviet arms and arms geared to Soviet standards from Chinese arsenals. The force which emerged from the Korean War had learned much about modern mechanized warfare, and although it lacked the firepower of the armies it opposed, it was moving toward standardized modern equipment and mobilization.

The forces of the People's Liberation Army today number more than 2.5 million men. These are supplemented by militia, usually estimated at more than 10 million; security forces of 700,000, promoted to rank with the air force and the navy as a separate service during 1956; and sizable ready reserve forces. The Chinese obviously do not lack manpower.

Nominally the PLA comes under the Minister of Defense P'eng Te-huai and the State Council. It is also responsible to the National Defense Council of which Mao is chairman and seven of the 15 vice-chairmen are members of the Party Politburo. Such overlapping of functions indicates that the Politburo is indeed the body which controls the PLA. The PLA itself is under General Su Yü who is Chief of General Staff. It is divided into six general departments (political, training, cadres, inspectorate, rear services and finance) and nine arms (air force, navy, artillery, public security, armored, air defense, engineers, railway, chemical, and the special Peking-Tientsin Garrison Command) in addition to the five field armies of ground forces which have now been relieved from area administration functions and are directly responsible to the capital.

The bulk of Chinese armed might is in the 150-170 ground warfare divisions of 10-12,000 men each. A sizable proportion of these divisions are now organized and equipped along Soviet lines. The best equipped have 57mm. recoilless rifles, heavy mortars, rocket launchers, 70mm. howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, and automatic weapons. Three divisions are grouped as an army, and current accent is on building up heavy artillery in which the armies are deficient. Red Army leaders have also pushed road and railroad construction to develop fullest possible mobility in the primitive Chinese countryside and guarantee flow of supplies from Chinese arsenals and from the Soviet Union. The PLA employs probably more than 20,000 heavy Soviet trucks (now being supplemented by trucks of Chinese manufacture) in addition to heavy mobile artillery and armored units.

The navy is the weakest of the services with a few outdated ships taken over from the Nationalists and consisting for the most part of thousands of motorized junks. It is difficult to confirm claims that it is being equipped with Soviet submarines.

On the other hand, the PLA air force has already demonstrated that it is a formidable organization. Like the Soviet air force it is organized into divisions. There are an estimated 30. Current estimates put its strength at more than 2,500 planes, of which more than half are jets. These include late models of the MIG-15, IL-28 jet bombers and even some TU- long-range heavy bombers—all of Soviet design and manufacture. At the September Party Congress claims were advanced that the

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Chinese had already turned out a jet of their own manufacture. At least 10 jet airfields have been constructed near the coast opposite Taiwan (Formosa) and others at such strategic spots as Wan Hai, northeast of the Burma border, and in Tibet. These supplement regular jet bases over the country.

All of this adds up to a tremendous military force in being, a force made doubly powerful by the weakness of the exposed countries along China's borders. But turning the primitive guerrilla forces of 1949 into a modern mechanized arm of state power has also created problems. Some of these are long range and involve the Chinese economy and educational level of the populace, others are directly related to the actual transformation of the character of the forces. Mao and his colleagues have been tackling these problems with vigor.

One of the first problems, following the end of hostilities in Korea, was to eliminate the age-old enlistment system (voluntary and involuntary) and establish regularized conscripted forces as a part of the national scene. The regime started a concerted effort in this direction in 1955 with a February 8 promulgation of regulations for the services of officers and the passage on July 30 of a Military Service Law. Under the latter more than half a million youths were drafted between November 1 and the end of February the following year for regular service—three years for the army, four for the air force, five for the navy. In November, 1956, conscription of a new group who had reached the age of 18 began again, but for reasons as yet undisclosed was called off in several of the Southern provinces. As a part of the Military Service Law, students in upper-middle schools and institutions of higher learning are required to take military training. The regime can, of course, be highly selective in their draft for sustaining the armed forces at the present level, given the size of the Chinese population.

This regularizing of a steady stream of manpower for the PLA has made possible the demobilizing of great numbers of old-timers, unskilled former peasants, and Kuomintang troops. Demobilization started after the end of hostilities in Korea and reached a peak in 1955 and 1956. Peking announced on November 5, 1956, that more than 5 million men had already been demobilized and that an additional 800,000 would be demobilized during 1957. Self-criticism in the press indicated that the authorities were having great difficulties absorbing the former servicemen into the civilian economy. Charges that they were being discriminated against appeared regularly in the press, and several conferences were called for the express purpose of dealing with the problem. Again, the servicemen themselves, most of whom had enlisted as country boys and had no roots or special skills and many of whom had been somewhat pampered as China's elite for many years, proved

Tank units of the People's Liberation Army

somewhat difficult in their dealings with others. The *People's Daily* editorialized on November 18, 1956:

> . . . some dependents and veterans have not made a good exhibition of themselves. They demand from the state and the masses special care which is unreasonable. Some veterans suited for work in rural areas do not wish to go to rural areas, and thus lose the respect of the people for them, lose their own glory.

Meanwhile within the armed forces the shift from the comrade armies of old to regularized and technical services and the introduction of clear distinctions between officers and men and among the various officer grades have led to further problems. T'an Cheng reported serious deviations which have developed when he addressed the Party Congress on September 23: abuse of power against enlisted men, neglect of ideological work, estrangement from the people and local party and government organs, and failure to relate political knowledge and military technique. Other spokesmen commented about officers putting on airs, getting more money than they knew how to spend, and sitting in their barracks refusing to do any more services for the people. The *Liberation Army News,* published three times weekly in Peking, has noted ill will between old-timers and the new technicians. In an attempt to overcome some of these problems the Central Committee of the Party directed the PLA to start a new course in political indoctrination beginning in 1956. Officers with rank of major and above are required to take a five-year course dealing with the history of the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties, principles of party organization and expansion, and dialectical and historical materialism.

It has become obvious that the Politburo is having difficulty keeping the old revolutionary fervor alive in this new type of military machine, especially in the absence of large-scale hostilities. PLA units are now located in military reservations and not so generally apparent in civilian centers. Civilians no longer give support and

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concern to army men as in the past, and the *People's Daily* reports actual hostility.

But the major problem involved in creating a modern military machine involves the technical and educational level of the Chinese. The PLA must compete with industry for the limited number of skilled personnel in China, and it is on the growth of that very industry that the development of the PLA depends. Personnel have proved generally slow and imprecise in the handling of complex equipment, and maintenance continues as in the past to be a major concern. The Chinese armed forces are notably poor in communications equipment and personnel to handle it. They are still primarily dependent upon Soviet supplies and this involves language problems as well as the transport problem. To date, mass literacy programs have proved notably unsuccessful within the ranks of the PLA.

A LAND ARMY

DESPITE these many problems, the PLA is an effective and powerful military force. It has already made its impact felt in Asia and it continues to be a key item in the control structure inside China. Its strength should not, however, be overestimated. Transport facilities inside China are poor and vulnerable, Chinese industry is inadequate for sustaining this type of army, and it is sufficiently dependent upon Soviet assistance to give Moscow strong restraining power over its employment. China's heavy industrialization program is geared to sustaining this modern military establishment, but that in turn is limited by population pressure, limited resources, and the educational level of the people. In short, the PLA is powerful mainly as a force in being but not as a force capable of prolonged operations without reverting to former guerrilla status.

Internally the military's role is varied. Its mobilized manpower has, according to P'eng Te-huai, an "historic task during the period of socialism." P'eng pointed out that, during 1956, 31 divisions and 8 regiments had been shifted to "work of production and construction." These included defense works, road building, afforestation and the organization and control of collective farms in South and West China. Unspecified numbers of former Nationalist troops are used in forced labor for railroad construction and water conservancy. PLA units have established collective farms in Sinkiang province and have been playing a key role in the administration of Tibet. Security forces have been carrying on a campaign against "hidden counter-revolutionaries" since 1955. Together with the militia they have been maintaining internal security and helping to supervise the forced rate of collectivization which was by the end of 1956 more than 91 percent complete.

The great numbers of Chinese mobilized in regular and reserve military units play a vital role in sustaining the self-proclaimed dictatorship of the Peking regime. The tremendous parades of modern massed military might in Chinese cities and towns on Communist holidays serve to impress upon the people the futility of individual resistance in the face of such order, power and discipline. Displays such as the usual October 1 parade in Peking also serve to evoke national pride and enthusiasm, sustain the self-confidence of the leaders who direct them, and, perhaps just as important, impress foreign visitors with the great power which China has seemingly achieved because of its adherence to the Communist camp. Certainly Mao and his colleagues have been just as conscious of the importance of armed force in international politics as they were of its role inside modern China.

Peking has undoubtedly drawn some satisfaction from recent trends in Western military policy. All signs seem to point to an unwillingness to fight conventional land-warfare operations, and yet there seems to be a general agreement that the threat of mutual destruction makes use of the new super weapons improbable. Surely the Communist leaders have sensed the unwillingness of Western powers to engage in operations involving heavy casualties for limited goals; for example, the British and French strategy in Egypt, the unwillingness to go to the aid of Hungary. Would the United States, for example, be willing to engage in another Korean-type war in defense of Burma were the present incursions into Burmese territory to develop into full-scale invasion? Certainly there are some doubts among Burmese leaders. Western reductions of conventional warfare capabilities on a drastic scale adds immeasurably to the comparative strength of the PLA in non-industrialized Asia. It strengthens China's hand in any diplomatic negotiations relating to the unsettled problems along her borders.

Chou En-lai talked persuasively about peaceful coexistence during his recent trip through South Asia, but he never failed to remind people of the great power of "new China." Political leaders, journalists, businessmen and others who accompanied the many visiting delegations to Peking had witnessed parades of Chinese armed power and were able to lend emphasis to his words.

This recognition accorded to China's power helps to sustain the morale of the politico-military leadership in China. But long-range morale is sustained primarily by crisis and threat. For the armed forces of Communist China this is provided within the framework of the implacable worldwide struggle spelled out for them in the documents which they study. "American imperialism" is their enemy, and the isolation and defeat of this enemy is the most compelling reason for the continued buildup of armed might in China, for as Comrade Mao explains, "Liberated China and a liberated world are inseparable."

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NEXT—COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP?

Mao and the Succession

The "Cult of Personality" Must Be Discussed With Caution in the Chinese Communist Movement—"Almost the Personal Creation of This One Man"

by ROBERT C. NORTH

THE DEATH of Stalin and the subsequent struggle for power in the Soviet Union tempt speculation about the Chinese Communist elite and their attitudes toward "personality cults," "collective leadership" and the problem of succession in Mao Tse-tung's China. Records of the recent Eighth Party Congress in Peking reveal, moreover, that Mao and his colleagues are themselves not unmindful of the relevance which Russian shake-ups bear to the future of their own movement and its hierarchy of power. Mao, whose health has not been good, is now 64 years old, and higher party echelons were somewhat troubled with internal conflict a few years back.

This is not to suggest that Mao is already on the shelf. On the contrary, spokesmen at the Eighth Congress, both Chinese and Russian, paid him tribute as a theorist, tactician and innovator—higher public tribute than he received, even from his own party, while Stalin was alive. Under these circumstances, it was perhaps inevitable that Mao's colleagues would find it difficult to condemn "personality cults" and advocate "collective leadership" without considerable caution and equivocation.

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With a membership of more than 10 million men and women, primarily of peasant origin, the Chinese Communist Party is now the largest in the world, and its leadership has consolidated control over some 600 million people constituting nearly one-fourth of the population of the globe. Even more significantly, Mao and his lieutenants, in less than a decade, have transformed China from a weak and unwarlike nation into a major power of tested military competence. The future of Chinese Communist leadership, therefore, is a matter of concern to the whole world.

Generalizations about the likely course of Chinese Communist leadership development must remain highly speculative, but a brief consideration of the background, growth and characteristics of the elite may provide us with some tentative clues.

A first phase in the growth of Chinese Communist leadership opened shortly after World War I, when China seethed with young intellectuals intent on overthrowing the war-lord government in Peking and expelling foreigners whose economic and political control in the country they deeply resented. Of these rebels, those who had been educated in the United States and Japan tended to join Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, while Chou En-lai, Li Li-san and others trained in France tended to group around Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a professor at Peking University and father of the Chinese Communist Party. Later they were joined by young Chinese revolutionists trained in the Soviet Union or solely in China itself.

Chou En-lai, born in 1898 of landlord antecedents,

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was to become one of the most controversial of Chinese Communist leaders. Again and again Chou has managed —often at the last moment—to hop from the losing to the winning side of intra-party conflicts.

Among delegates to the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party in July, 1921, were Mao Tse-tung, a graduate of Hunan Normal School who symbolized a peasant element in the movement, and Chang Kuo-t'ao, who in the mid-1930s was the last serious contender for the leadership which Mao eventually achieved.

Thoroughly Chinese in his training and orientation, Mao has spent the largest part of his life in the countryside and probably did not leave his homeland even briefly until he visited the Soviet Union after his party had come to power. Communist leadership began, therefore, with a fusion of urban and rural elements, but in the end, as in the Soviet Union, it was the latter that largely prevailed.

For a time the Chinese Communists, under Soviet Russian direction, collaborated closely with the Kuomintang in seeking to overthrow the Peking Government, but in 1927 the right-wing Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek —and later the left-wing Nationalists—broke with the Communists, who were driven underground or into the hills. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, being held responsible for this policy failure by the Russians, was deposed from leadership.

During a second phase in Chinese Communist elite development, which lasted until about 1934, Moscow installed a series of leaders who followed one another in rapid order. Most notable of these was Li Li-san, who tried to carry out a program of urban insurrection under Russian directives. When this policy collapsed during the autumn of 1930, Li Li-san was called to Moscow and haled before an investigating commission, which induced him to "confess his errors" and to stay and "study a few months and work with the Comintern to correct his mistakes." He did not return to China until 1945, but at the Eighth Congress last September, Li Li-san confessed again—admitting this time that he had been making mistakes for a full 26 years.

Since the early 1920s the Russians had been encouraging young Chinese to study in the Soviet Union, and with the fall of Li Li-san, a group of these Returned Students who, according to party veterans, were "taking milk at their mothers' breasts" when the Chinese movement began, placed themselves in party power under Comintern sponsorship. These new leaders obtained grovelling confessions from Chou En-lai and others who had been caught in the party switch, but Chou, after admitting "cowardly rotten opportunism," obtained a respectable post on the new Central Committee.

Mao, in the meantime, had been busy organizing Soviets in the countryside and building a peasant army. In the course of this activity, largely out of Comintern reach, he began the canny and ruthless elimination of party comrades who presented a serious challenge to his personal progress. While the Returned Students were still in nominal party power, moreover, the pressure of Kuomintang "extermination campaigns" forced Chinese Communist leaders to undertake the Long March, and it was during this incredible migration to the Northwest that a third phase of leadership development began.

In the course of a wide detour through southern China, the main column of the Long March halted in January, 1935, for a few days of consultation and rest; and it was at this point, when Communist leaders were out of touch with Moscow, that Mao pressed charges against the Returned Students—accusing them, among other things, of faulty tactics in guerrilla warfare against the Nationalists. During these debates a disagreement developed



Chou En-lai Mao Tse-tung Liu Shao-chi

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

Teng Hsiao-ping addresses Eighth Party Congress, Peking, 1956

between Mao and Chang Kuo-t'ao, who was leading a separate column of the Long March and communicating by telegraph. This marked the beginning of a serious struggle between the two leaders which culminated some three years later after the Communists were well-established at Yenan in the Northwest. By that time Mao had sufficient power to expel Chang from the Party, and Russian leaders in Moscow, perhaps recognizing the persuasive power of a *fait accompli,* dispatched their concurrence. Chou En-lai, who had been involved in the controversy, once more ended up on the winning side.

During subsequent years, while the Japanese War was in progress, Mao initiated the Cheng-feng or Ideological Remolding Movement "to correct undesirable and erroneous tendencies." Supporting Mao in this movement was Liu Shao-ch'i, who had joined the party in 1921 and had been elected to the Politburo 10 years later, but who now achieved a new prominence, largely as a theoretician. Liu, like Mao, was born in Hunan of well-to-do peasant stock, studied at Hunan Normal School, and attended Peking University. He is also believed to have studied in the Soviet Union. During the 1920s he had worked with Li Li-san as a union organizer and with Mao in the Hunan countryside. In years to come his name and that of Chou En-lai would be linked with increasing frequency as possible rivals for the succession to Mao.

The Cheng-feng Movement adjusted Soviet Russian ideology and mass political techniques to conditions in China and served Mao, at the same time, as an effective instrument of purge. In the course of Cheng-feng conferences and cadre organizing a group of Mao's remaining opponents went into eclipse. Beyond this, Cheng-feng was a procedure for dissolving traditional Chinese morality and for substituting a strictly Communist code of ethics and behavior. During the movement, Chinese leaders found ways to probe the human psyche and "remold" the party member.

By the end of the Japanese War in 1945 the Chinese Communist leadership was something quite different from what it had been under Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, or the Returned Students. Urban intellectual elements had largely been displaced in top ranks by men of rural origins. Chinese Communist leaders, moreover, had become highly experienced professional revolutionists and military men. Over the years, almost incessant warfare had promoted the political soldier, whose career was closely correlated with the rise of Mao and with his policy of peasant revolt and the formation of guerrilla bases, and had accomplished thereby a distinct plebeianization of the party elite.

Characteristically, the rising Chinese Communist leader had been born somewhere in the Yangtze watershed (rather than in Canton or some other city of south China) of landlord or well-to-do peasant stock. Some had little education at all, while others, after attending Chinese schools, had gone to the Soviet Union for special-

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ized study. Very few had experienced close contact with Westerners either in Chinese port cities or abroad (apart from the Soviet Union). Their early lives had been spent close to the Chinese soil, and individuals, while still in their teens or early twenties, had joined peasant movements, rural Communist organizations or the Red Army. A large percentage had taken part in the Long March and had seen action, either as soldiers or as commissars, in guerrilla campaigns against Nationalist and later against Japanese armies. In addition to their early party indoctrination and their training in the Soviet Union, they had been schooled and "remolded" by Cheng-feng.

THE KAO-JAO PURGE

THERE was more fighting to come, however, and it is the Chinese Communist struggle for supreme power and the establishment and consolidation of the People's Republic that characterize a fourth phase of leadership development. After World War II Chinese Red armies, equipped with American weapons captured from the Nationalists and with Japanese rifles turned over to them by Soviet Russian forces, began their sweep of the Chinese mainland. By October, 1949, Mao and his party had achieved power and were ready to begin the systematic neutralization and annihilation of opposing elements among the population.

During this political consolidation a new purge took place. On April 4, 1955, it was announced that Kao Kang, one-time party boss in Manchuria and reputedly fifth-ranking member of the party hierarchy, had been purged along with Jao Shu-shih, who was secretary of the Central Committee, director of the Organization Department of the party, and former political boss in East China. The charge was that these men had been engaged in "conspiratorial activities aimed at seizing the reins of leadership of the party and the State." Kao Kang's expulsion from the party seemed a trifle superfluous in as much as the victim had committed suicide a year previously.

From the outside it is almost impossible to ascertain precisely what conflicts lay behind the Kao-Jao purge and what new party equilibrium resulted. Some observers have suggested that Liu Shao-ch'i may have suffered from close association with Jao and from espousal of Kao's "soft" line toward the peasantry at a time when the party was putting into effect a ruthless drive for collectivization in the countryside. According to this argument, the position of Chou En-lai was probably strengthened by the party and State reorganization that took place after the purge. On the other hand, it is also argued that during intra-party maneuvering prior to the Eighth Congress Chou may have lost whatever advantages he had gained.

Whatever the facts in the power balance may be, we find the Eighth Congress opening last September with outward evidences of unity, with hierarchies of party and State closely inter-knit, and with the leadership ostensibly disturbed by the problem of how to harmonize the Mao "personality cult" with recent Soviet Russian pronouncements on "collective leadership."

The new Chinese Communist Politburo chosen at the Eighth Congress reflects trends which have been evident since Mao achieved party control. All members of the current Politburo but one were born somewhere in the Yangtze basin; seven claim birthplaces in Mao's province of Hunan. Of those whose social origins are known, four are of peasant parentage, six are the sons of landlords, two describe their fathers as merchant and military official respectively, and one—and only one—claims anything approaching a proletarian background.

Every Politburo member is a party veteran with many years of experience within the movement. All were party members by 1929, and eight joined during the first two years of the party's existence. Three were among those who founded the French branch of the Communist Party in 1921, and all but two participated in the Long March. There is no evidence, on this top level, of any infusion of young blood. The Chinese Communist Politburo is an aging group, the current average being 61 years as compared with a little over 29 years when the party was founded, 35 years at the time of the Long March, and not quite 50 years at the end of World War II. What began as a notably youthful leadership is now comfortably mature. Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-ch'i are both 59—only five years younger than Mao.

As far as can be determined, seven of these Politburo members were educated solely in China and have been exposed to a minimum of Western influences. At least eight of the remainder had some training in the USSR. A few studied in Japan, Germany and, especially, France.

These 17 men hold at least 77 top-level positions—32 in the party, 25 in the government, and 20 in the armed forces. Considering the pervasiveness and pyramidal structure of Communist hierarchies, we may conclude, therefore, that these men serve as an interlocking directorship over nearly the whole of Chinese society, with Mao occupying the preeminent position.

THE question then arises how this leadership differs from that in the Soviet Union under Stalin. There are, of course, many inherent differences between traditional Chinese and Russian ways of life, but the importance of these is perhaps difficult to evaluate. Somewhat more concrete are certain variations in the circumstances under which the two leaderships developed.

Mao, unlike Stalin, forged his organization in the field while the conflict for national control was still in progress. We have seen how, until the early 1930s, Moscow had made and broken Chinese Communist leaders. But thereafter, these early leaders were relegated to secondary

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roles or were totally eliminated. Moscow's blessing continued to be desirable, no doubt, but through the years on-the-spot performance in China had become increasingly important in promotion to leadership, with the result that men won prominence and prestige by proving to Mao their endurance, personal magnetism, administrative excellence, propaganda aptitude, organizational competence, or courage and cunning at guerrilla warfare. A leader, even if approved by Moscow, had to be tough, to command respect, to be able, and to be loyal to Mao.

By 1949, therefore, when the People's Republic was established, Mao enjoyed almost unquestioned authority over a highly developed and efficient hierarchy of police, armed forces, and party organization on all levels down to the rank and file. The whole Chinese Communist movement had already taken shape as almost the personal creation of this one man, and the structure had been firmly welded together both by his purges in the field and by the life-or-death necessities of a bitter revolutionary struggle. It is doubtful if even the Kao-Jao affair constituted a really serious challenge to his position. Mao's first lieutenants, morever, were almost all "first generation" Communists, party veterans whose life-time careers had been inextricably interwoven with his. They had won their greatest victories and consequent promotions at his side and, for the most part, years before the party had achieved power in China.

Stalin also shaped his own leadership, but he accomplished this after the Communist Party had come to power and after he had eliminated a large proportion of his own contemporaries, the party veterans who had helped Lenin seize control in Russia. To visualize Soviet circumstances more nearly comparable to those that exist in the current Chinese Communist leadership, we would have to imagine the prolonged survival of Lenin surrounded by lieutenants who had worked faithfully at his side since well before the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.

It is obviously impossible to predict whether Mao will be succeeded by Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, or some other individual, or whether the Chinese Communists will attempt a form of collective leadership. We can surmise, however, that spokesmen at the Eighth Congress may have had the latter possibility in mind when they discussed the problem of the "cult of the personality" with more than a little caution and ambivalence. For while under current circumstances it would serve no worthwhile Chinese Communist purpose to tamper with Mao's preeminence, a collective leadership of party veterans might prove the best solution to the problem of succession after his death or incapacitation.

If such a transition were to take place smoothly, the leadership of Communist China would still reside with veterans who had worked closely with Mao over many years and who had taken part in the shaping of the revolutionary movement almost from its inception.

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